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Cuban-Americans and the “Anti-Embargo” Poll** |
| As the new administration takes form, a plethora of think-tank recommendation papers are available to justify practically any policy initiative. Unfortunately, the rush for the president-elect's ear does not always result in rigorous analysis. For example, a recent poll conducted in Miami among Cuban-Americans purports to show that a majority favor ending the U.S. trade embargo of Cuba. This poll is now incorrectly cited as clear evidence of a shift in attitude among Cuban-Americans. But that conclusion does not follow from the survey question: "Do you favor or oppose continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba?” Opponents of the embargo interpret it as a desire for an unconditional, unilateral, end to the embargo without concessions from the Cuban government. That conclusion cannot be legitimately inferred from the question asked. A different survey question-for example: "Do you favor a unilateral, unconditional lifting of the embargo, or do you favor a process of negotiations that would lead to concessions from the Cuban government?"-would yield different results. Another example is a 2½-page section on Cuba, which is part of a broader report. The Cuba section, perhaps striving for succinctness, appears superficial. The authors present views as self-evident truths without explaining how they know what is claimed to be known. Its first recommendation, "Lift all restrictions on travel to Cuba by Americans," is followed by a single sentence truth-claim that, "The ability of Americans to travel to Cuba would allow for better understanding, promote small businesses, and provide information to the Cuban people." It is not explained how travel by American tourists would differ from that of millions of tourists from Canada and elsewhere who have visited Cuba for decades without advancing a transition to openness. How do the authors reach this conclusion on the impact of American tourism? Other recommendations also fail to explain their underlying logic. One argues that liberalizing the sale of communications equipment, including computers, "would encourage the transfer of information and free flow of ideas." But what is so magical about American branded computers for this free flow of ideas that is not available in computers from other countries readily available to Cuba? It also goes unnoted that the Cuban government allows less than 2 percent of Cubans (mostly government officials) access to the Internet. Another recommendation seeks to "Remove caps and targeting restrictions on remittances." It then offers a one sentence rationalization: "These financial measures would help get resources directly into the hands of ordinary Cubans, empowering them, improving their standard of living and reducing their dependence on the state." One can advocate ending restrictions on remittances on humanitarian grounds. However, a thoughtful analysis needs to note that this will deliver hard currency resources to the Cuban regime. While this may be a policy cost worth incurring, the rationalization above suggests that the state is circumvented. In Cuba's economic system-where the state controls almost all production-the purchasing power provided by these remittances flows to the state. Another problem is a failure to differentiate between "knowing that" and "knowing how." Often reports begin with a repudiation of U.S. policy on Cuba noting that it has failed to change the Cuban regime. This is a valid "knowing that" claim. It does not follow, however, that an alternative policy embodies "know-how" to change the Cuban regime; labeling one approach a failure does not provide an automatic truth-claim for an alternative approach. This is not to argue for a status quo approach to U.S. policy on Cuba.
Rethinking a strategy is not synonymous with apostasy. However, it is
troubling to read Cuba policy recommendation reports that are silent
on political prisoners, civil liberties or political rights. One is
left to wonder if the authors understand the nature of the Cuban government
and ignore it, relying on some unexplained change theory, or whether
they opt for a Faustian bargain. _________________________________________________
*José Azel is a senior research associate at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami. Dr. Azel was an adjunct professor of international business at the School of Business Administration, University of Miami. He holds undergraduate and master’s degrees in business administration and a Ph. D. in international affairs from the University of Miami. _________________________________________________
**Previously published in the Miami Herald on December 19, 2008. |