An Information Service of the Cuba Transition Project Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies University of Miami

 

Jaime Suchlicki*

     Despite mounting economic difficulties, the Cuban government is not likely to open up Cuba’s economy or to offer meaningful concessions to the U.S. for normalization of relations.

     The Castro brothers believe that increasing hardships will not produce an internal rebellion. General Raul Castro recently reduced the availability of food that Cubans receive through the ration cards. If there was concern for popular unrest, this type of measure would have not been introduced.

     Political and economic centralization and control, and ideological rigidity are the chosen policies to guarantee a successful succession and to prevent Cuba’s transformation into a democratic, market economy.

      Major concessions to the U.S. would mean a rejection of one of Fidel Castro’s main legacies: anti-Americanism. It may create uncertainty among the elites that govern Cuba leading to friction and factionalism. The Cuban population also could see this as an opportunity for mobilization demanding faster reforms. It could also be seen as a weakening of Cuba’s anti-American alliances with radical regimes in Latin America, Iran and Syria and Cuba’s defection from the anti-imperialist front.

      U.S. recognition may mean a victory for Raul and the legitimization of his military regime. Yet it is a small prize when compared to the uncertainties that a Cuba-U.S. relation may produce internally and externally among Cuba’s allies.

     From Cuba’s point of view, the U.S. has little to offer. American tourists, which Raul doesn’t need to survive; American investments, which he fears may subvert his highly centralized and controlled economy; and products that he can buy cheaper from other countries. The U.S. does not have, furthermore, the ability to provide Cuba with the petroleum Venezuela is sending with little or no payment. Aid from Venezuela, Iran, Russia and China, furthermore, are provided with no conditions. These regimes demand little from Cuba.

     The periodic public statements that Raul has made about wanting negotiations with the U.S. are politically motivated and directed at audiences in the U.S. and Europe. In particular, Raul believes that the “correlation of forces” are such in the U.S. that Congress may lift the travel ban and end the embargo unilaterally, without Cuba having to make any concessions. Serious overtures for negotiations are usually not issued from the plaza. They are carried out through normal diplomatic avenues open to the Cubans. These avenues have never been closed as evidenced by the migration accord and the anti-hijacking agreement between the U.S. and Cuba. In the past both Democratic and Republican administrations have had conversations with Cuban officials and made serious overtures for normalization, only to be rebuffed.

      The issue is not about negotiations or talking. There has to be a willingness on the part of the Cuban leadership to offer real concessions-in the area of human rights and political and economic openings as well as cooperation on anti-terrorism and drug interdiction-for the U.S. to change its policies. The U.S., as well as other countries, do not give away major policies without a substantial quid pro quo. Only when Raul is willing to deal, not only to the United States, but more importantly to the Cuban people, then and only then the U.S. should change its policies.

     If the U.S. starts negotiations with officials of the Castro government, the following are some of the possible concessions and demands of the Cuban government.

     I. The Cuban government would want:

1. The lifting of the travel ban for Americans to visit Cuba and an end to the embargo.
2. Access to credits from the U.S. as well as from international organizations.
3. Payment for the “damage” caused by the U.S. embargo (between $40-50 billion).
4. Access to the U.S. market to sell Cuban products.
5. Release and return of the five Cuban spies condemned by U.S. courts and currently in U.S. jails.
6. Return to Cuba of the Guantanamo naval base.
7. Increase the number of Cubans allowed to migrate legally to the U.S. (from 20,000 to 30,000 or 40,000 per year).
8. End of the U.S. policy of wet/dry foot.
9. Permission for Cubans to travel to the U.S. as visitors.
10. An end to Radio/TV Marti transmissions to Cuba as well as the USAID Cuba Program.
11. Removal from the U.S. State Department terrorism list.

     
II. In return, the Cuban government would be willing to:

1. Pay for U.S. confiscated properties ($5-6 billion) to be deducted from reparations paid by the U.S. for the embargo.
2. Release most political prisoners in Cuban jails as long as they are accepted into the U.S.
3. Allow American investments in selected sectors of the Cuban economy and in partnership with the Cuban government, off-shore oil exploration; tourist hotels and resorts; the sugar industry; etc.
4. Buy more American products, particularly if the U.S. provides credit.
5. Control the flow of illegal Cuban migration into the U.S.
6. Cooperate in drug interdiction.
7. Return several American fugitives from the U.S. legal system now living in the island.
8. Upgrade diplomatic relations and receive a U.S. Ambassador.
9. Permit U.S. diplomats in Cuba to travel outside of Havana.
10. Stop harassing U.S. diplomats in Cuba.

III. From the Cuban government’s point of view, the following are not negotiable:

1. Cuba’s internal political and economic system.
2. The issue of human rights, since Cuba claims there are no violations of human rights in the island.
3. The government’s control of the media, internet, all publications.
4. The government’s control of the educational system.
5. The government’s control of the labor movement.
6. Cuba’s international relations; especially with Venezuela, Iran, and Russia.
7. Cuba’s support for anti-American, leftist and terrorist organizations throughout the world.
8. The Chinese cyber-electronic facility operating in Bejucal near Havana.
9. A possible Russian space tracking station to be built in Cuba.
10. The visits to Cuba of Russian military planes and naval ships.

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* Jaime Suchlicki is Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami. He is the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro, now in its fifth edition; Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA, now in its second edition and the recently published Breve Historia de Cuba.