An Information Service of the
Cuba Transition Project
Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies
University of Miami

Issue 112
September 15, 2009

 

 

 

 

Jaime Suchlicki*

Cuban-Russian Growing Military Cooperation

 

The chief of the Russian General Staff arrived in Cuba on September 15 for a working visit at the invitation of the Cuban military leadership. Gen. Nikolai Makarov will meet with his Cuban counterpart Gen. Alvaro Lopez Miera and other top brass, and "visit a number of military installations," Russian Ambassador in Cuba Mikhail Kamynin said. Bilateral military ties have been improving following the visit of Russian Security Council chief Nikolai Patrushev and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin to Cuba in July of last year. A group of Russian warships visited Cuba in December during a Caribbean tour. Moscow had a military presence on Cuba for almost four decades after the Cuban Missile Crisis, maintaining an electronic listening post at Lourdes, in Havana, to monitor U.S. military activity and communications. Some Russian military sources have recently indicated that if a political decision is made Moscow could resume operations at the Lourdes facility and also use airbases in Cuba for refueling of strategic aircraft.

Following is a Cuba Transition Project, "Cuba Focus," on Russian-Cuban relations published in December 2006.

 

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An Information Service of the
Cuba Transition Project
Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies
University of Miami

 

 

Issue 82
December 18, 2006

 

 

Jaime Suchlicki

 

The Russians are Coming


In his first major policy initiative since assuming power, General Raul Castro signed a far reaching military aid agreement with Russia. In September 2006, Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, visited Cuba and signed an economic aid pact providing Raul Castro with $350 million in credits to upgrade Cuba's armed forces, including the acquisition of Russian transportation equipment, air navigation systems, industrial goods for the energy sector, and financing of future Russian investments in Cuba, among other projects. Fradkov met with Raul Castro in a climate described as “cordial and friendly” by the Cuban press.

This accord with the Russians rounds out Cuba's international alliances with key strategic countries. They include Venezuela, China, and Iran. Whether the Russian deal was in the making prior to Fidel Castro's surgery or developed as a more recent initiative, reaffirms Raul Castro's long standing admiration and support for Soviet policies in the past and for Russian policies in the present.

As a young man, Raul traveled behind the iron curtain and became a member of Cuba's Communist Party. Throughout the duration of the Soviet-Cuban relationship (1960-1990), Fidel and Raul remained steadfast friends and supporters of Soviet policies, particularly in Africa, where several hundred thousand Cuban soldiers aided in bringing pro-Soviet and pro-Cuban regimes to power in the African continent. Raul seems fascinated by the Soviet military and displays photos and statues of Soviet generals in his office in Havana.

It was only natural then that Raul would turn to his old allies and friends for support as he consolidates power in Cuba. The Russians can provide his military dictatorship, in addition to weapons, with credits to purchase other Russian products. If the relationship with Venezuela were to sour or Venezuela decreases its oil shipments to Cuba, the Russians could step in and help. Much of Cuba's non-military equipment is Russian made and requires upgrading and replacement. Finally, Russian international positions, influence in the United Nations Security Council, and increasing defiance of U. S. policies, fit Raul Castro's world view and interests.

What can the Russians expect from a renewed relationship with Cuba? For starters, the Russians haven't given up on what they claim is Cuba's debt from the Soviet era, approximately $20 billion. In 1991, I participated in a conference on Cuban-Russian relations in Moscow, and the Russian side, both academic and government officials, insisted that the Cuban debt should be paid. My response then was that even if Cuba had the means, it would not recognize or pay that debt, Castro would always claim that Cuba's sacrifices in support of Soviet policies throughout the world far surpassed Russian economic help to Cuba. The debt seems to have been off the official agenda during Fradkov’s visit.

The Russians also may be interested in resuming and expanding Cold War era espionage cooperation. The Soviet Union built the Lourdes electronic eavesdropping facility near Havana and used it to spy on the American military and technological secrets. It was closed by the Soviets following U. S. pressure in the 1990's, but could be recreated in the island. The Chinese have established a similar facility in Bejucal, Cuba, and the Russians may look with envious eyes at the Chinese capacity to tap into American military and civilian technology. Cooperation between the KGB and Stasi-trained Cuban espionage services, one of the best in the world, could resume, if it ever stopped, with the Cubans providing special help to the Russians.

It is yet too early to tell how far Cuban-Russian cooperation will advance or if it will represent a challenge to U. S. interests and security. Yet the new military aid agreement and the new spirit of Russian-Cuban cooperation may indicate a continuous Cuban militancy and opposition to U. S. policies and a willingness to restart a relationship with an old, albeit much weaker and somewhat different, ally.

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* Jaime Suchlicki is Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami. He is the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro, now in its fifth edition; Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA, now in its second edition and the recently published Breve Historia de Cuba.