By the mid-1960s, as ideological disputes between Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev escalated into an international Sino-Soviet confrontation for the hearts and minds of the communist world, Fidel Castro had to choose between Beijing's rice and Moscow's rubles. Not surprisingly, Castro aligned Cuba with his regime's Soviet benefactors and criticized the Chinese for their "Byzantine disagreements" and "academic charlatanry." When Beijing responded by refusing to supply more rice to Cuba, Castro accused China's leadership of outright "betrayal." Castro condemned the Chinese's "subtle, insinuating, and crafty way," decrying in 1966, "The Government of China has in fact joined the Yankee blockade against Cuba." Cuba and China would remain distant and distrustful "comrades" until the end of the Cold War.(1)

     After the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the ensuing disintegration of the USSR in the early 1990s, Moscow's annual multibillion-dollar subsidies for the Cuban economy came to an abrupt end. By the time Mikhail Gorbachev visited Havana in April 1989, it was evident that Castro had no interest in implementing the Soviet leader's Glasnost and Perestroika reforms in Cuba. Abandoned by a bankrupt and teetering Soviet Union, Castro sought out new friends and old allies wherever he could still find them.

     When Deng Xiaoping ordered in Chinese troops to suppress pro-democracy demonstrators in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in June 1989, Havana condoned the ruthless use of force by China's hard-line communist leadership. Castro, who also backed the failed coup d'etat against Gorbachev in 1991, "blamed the bloodshed [at Tiananmen] on counter-revolutionary elements."(2) On the occasion of Deng's death in 1997, Castro hailed "the illustrious son of the Chinese nation" for his "valiant contribution to the cause of construction and consolidation of socialism in China."(3)

MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

      In the immediate post-Tiananmen era, which coincided with Cuba's severe economic crisis following the demise of the Soviet Union, Castro found a suitable patron in Chinese President Jiang Zemin. While Jiang did not pick up the tab for Cuba's mismanaged economy as Soviet premiers had done for three decades, neither did China's pragmatic leader demand any reforms from Castro. Moreover, with Havana politically isolated, Jiang's landmark visit to Cuba in 1993 bolstered Castro's standing on the world stage. More importantly for the regime's survival prospects, Chinese cargo ships laden with rice and bicycles were among the few vessels arriving regularly at the port of Havana in the early 1990s. As Castro acknowledged during the Chinese president's second visit to the island in 2001, "when Cuba suffered the biggest difficulties...Jiang gave [us] great support."(4) In exchange for Chinese support at a critical juncture for Castro's regime, Jiang crafted a mutually beneficial partnership with the Cuban leader, allowing Cuba to "stick to the road of its own choice"(5) while accommodating China's long-term strategic interests.

     For Havana, the benefits of a political alliance with Beijing have been tangible. Since the mid-1990s, China has been one of Cuba's top three trading partners, with bilateral trade averaging about US$400 million per year.(6) The Chinese government has financed Sino-Cuban commerce by extending some US$700 million in credits and loans to Cuban ministries and state-owned enterprises.(7) As one Cuban minister has acknowledged, "The [Chinese] credits are better, the products cheaper, and the arrangement less vulnerable to U.S. pressure."(8) Furthermore, China has been one of the island's leading suppliers of foodstuffs, including such staples of the Cuban diet as rice and beans. In addition, China has become a major market for Cuba's limited exports, primarily raw sugar and nickel. A number of joint ventures have also been established between Cuban state-owned firms and Chinese counterparts.

     Economic cooperation is particularly active between the two communist states' armed forces. For example, Suntime International Group, a holding of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA), has partnered with Cuba's military-controlled tourism industry to build luxury hotels in Shanghai and Havana.(9)

     Above and beyond the much-needed crutches for his regime's ailing economy, Castro today enjoys the patronage of a China seen as an emerging countervailing force to U.S. "hegemony" in international affairs. While Beijing undoubtedly welcomes Havana's "unconditional support to China and the problems of Taiwan and Tibet, human rights and other issues,"(10) Castro also stands taller with the Chinese leadership behind him.

QUID PRO QUO

     At first glance, Cuba in the early '90s -- on the brink of economic and political collapse -- had little to offer a rising global power like China. However, as one observer has noted, "when Chinese companies and the Chinese government develop a strategic plan, it's 50 to 100 years, whereas [in the West] we're looking at things quarter by quarter."(11) In less than a decade, China has already achieved at least one of its objectives in Cuba: establishing a strategic outpost in the Western Hemisphere close to the United States.

     With Sino-Cuban relations flourishing and an offer that Castro could not refuse, Jiang entrusted China's Defense Minister at the time, Chi Haotian, to negotiate a permanent presence for the PLA on Cuban soil. In February 1999, Chi visited Havana (12) to finalize an agreement with Cuban counterpart Raul Castro to operate joint Sino-Cuban signals intelligence and electronic warfare facilities in the island, equipped (at China's expense) with the latest telecommunications hardware and fully integrated into Beijing's global satellite network. By March 1999, PLA officers and technicians began monitoring U.S. telephone conversations and Internet data from this new cyber-warfare complex in the vicinity of Bejucal, some 20 miles south of Havana. A second installation, capable of eavesdropping on classified U.S. military communications by intercepting satellite signals, was also constructed on the eastern end of the island, near the city of Santiago de Cuba.(13)

     Coordination between the Chinese and Cuban armed forces has intensified since the opening of the electronic espionage bases. In December 2000, Gen. Fu Quanyou, the PLA's Chief of Staff, signed a landmark accord with his Cuban counterpart, Gen. Alvaro Lopez Miera, for broad military cooperation between Beijing and Havana.(14) While the terms of the treaty have not been disclosed, since the signing of the accord China has supplied at least conventional weapons and explosives to the Cuban government.(15) In lieu of their former pilgrimages to Moscow, senior generals of Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) now journey to Beijing "to further cooperation between the Chinese and Cuban armies under the fast-changing international situation," as Gen. Leopoldo Cintra Frias, commander of the FAR's Western Army, remarked this September 3rd during his meeting with China's current defense minister, Gen. Cao Gangchuan. General Cintra Frias, who also sits on the Politburo of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), stressed to the PLA's commanding general that "the Cuban army...needs to be modernized as soon as possible," and communicated Havana's gratitude for Beijing's "consistent support."(16)

     China's collaboration with Cuba may have grave implications for American national security. Beijing has proved that it is able and willing to use Cuba to monitor as well as disrupt U.S. telecommunications networks. Moreover, it is evident that China's hard-line establishment continues to cooperate closely with Castro and is less risk-averse when able to act through its Cuban proxy. Jiang, who left the presidency to Hu Jintao in March 2003, nonetheless remains at the helm in Beijing as Chairman of China's Central Military Commission (CMC). Cuba has meanwhile become a frequent destination for top Chinese generals. In 2004, at least three senior Chinese military delegations have traveled to Havana, including a visit in April by Gen. Xu Caihou, a member of the eight-man CMC headed by Jiang.(17) It was Jiang who befriended Castro in 1993 and has authorized hundreds of millions of dollars in subsidies to Havana to underwrite a strategic relationship with a partner who is anything but risk-averse.

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     Notes

1. Quotes are from Fidel Castro's speech, "Betrayal by Chinese Government of Cuban People's Good Faith," February 6, 1966, issued as a pamphlet in an official English translation.

2. Cf. The Guardian (UK), June 6, 1989.

3. Fidel Castro, as quoted in Reuters, "Castro praises Deng for consolidating socialism," Havana, 20 February 1997.

4. Cf. press release by the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Sweden, "President Jiang Zemin Held Talks with Cuban President Fidel Castro," 14 April 2001, online at [http://www.chinaembassy.se/eng/9795.html]. See also "Chinese, Cuban Presidents Discuss Bilateral Ties," People's Daily (China), 14 April 2001.

5. The words are Castro's, as cited in the press release by the Chinese embassy in Sweden. Cf. Note 4 above.

6. In 2003, Chinese exports to Cuba were valued at US$236 million. For its part, Cuba exported US$121 million in primarily sugar, nickel, and pharmaceutical products to China in the same year.

7. Between 2000 and 2002 alone, China provided at least US$682 million in new long-term, low-interest loans to finance joint ventures between Chinese enterprises and the Cuban government. Cf. "China to Modernize Cuban Telecommunications," People's Daily (China), May 30, 2000; "China Offers 400 Million Dollars in Loans to Cuba," People's Daily, April 14, 2001; Marc Frank, "Chinese-Cuban Business Takes Great Leap Forward," Havana, Reuters, April 11, 2001; and Feliberto Carrie, "El Banco de Shanghai concede a Cuba un credito por 72 millones de dolares para la construccion de un hotel," Havana, Europa Press, October 4, 2002.

8. Ignacio Gonzalez Planas, Cuba's IT and Telecommunications Minister, as quoted by Marc Frank, "Chinese-Cuban Business Takes Great Leap Forward," Havana, Reuters, April 11, 2001.

9. Suntime International Group is a subsidiary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). The Xinjiang Autonomous Region in western China is under People's Liberation Army (PLA) management through the quasi-military XPCC. The commander of the XPCC, Zhang Qingli, was promoted to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in November 2002. In December 2003, Zhang attended the groundbreaking ceremony for a 685-room luxury hotel under contruction in Shanghai's Pudong business district, a joint venture between Grupo Cubanacan, the largest of the Cuban Ministry of Tourism's hotel conglomerates, and the XPCC's Suntime Group. For more on the XPCC, see Xinhuanet, "Role of Xinjiang Production, Construction Corps important: white paper," 26 May 2003, online at [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-05/26/content_887338.htm.] Also see IPS Revista Semanal, "Comienza construccion de hotel cubano-chino," 3 December 2003, online at [http://www.ipsenespanol.net/cubaalamano/revista_semanal/031203-12.htm]. On the militarization of Cuba's tourism industry and economy in general, see "Tourists: by the left, march" in The Economist, 31 July 2004.

10. From a statement by Wang Zhiquan, then China's ambassador in Cuba, as quoted by Marc Frank, "Havana cooks up schemes to boost Beijing relations," Financial Times, 12 November 2003.

11. Insight on the Chinese's long-term strategic thinking is from John Kavulich, director of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, as quoted by Tracey Eaton, "Cuba, China quietly building partnership," Havana, The Dallas Morning News, 9 May 2001.

12. Radio Havana Cuba, "Chinese Defense Minister Wraps Up Official Visit to Cuba," Havana, 1 March 1999.

13. On the expansion of China's signals intelligence and electronic warfare installations abroad, including those in Cuba, see the study by Desmond Ball of The Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, "China and Information Warfare (IW): Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Electronic Warfare (EW) and Cyber-Warfare (W)," paper presented at the conference on Asian and Chinese Security Issues in the Decade 2001-2011, New Delhi, 25-29 January 2003; revised 28 February 2003. (Unpublished; courtesy of author). See also Hamish McDonald, "China loves the buena vista," The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 February 2003. In an apparent effort to disguise the covert nature of its telecommunications operations in Cuba, China's government-run Radio China International has been broadcasting short-wave English and Spanish-language programs from the Bejucal complex since mid-1999. (cf. Pablo Alfonso, "China instala dos bases de comunicacion en Cuba," El Nuevo Herald, 24 June 1999; Reuters, "Cuba broadcasts Radio China to Americas," 28 December 1999). The then head of Cuba's Communications Ministry, General Silvano Colas Sanchez, rejected allegations that the Chinese facility was involved in "any other use of a military kind." However, as an internal 1999 FCC report (cited by Alfonso above) indicated, "the Cubans [broadcasting from Bejucal, near Havana, and a second location in Pinar del Rio province] are interfering with air traffic control communications and making false aeronautical transmissions to New York Air Traffic Control."

14. Cf. The Associated Press, "Cuba, China Sign Military Accord," Havana, 28 December 2000.

15. Cf. Bill Gertz, "China Secretly Shipping Cuba Arms," The Washington Times, 12 June 2001; Bill Sammon, "Beijing's arms sale won't net sanctions," The Washington Times, 13 June 2001.

16. Remarks by Gen. Leopoldo Cintra Frias in Beijing, as quoted by Xinhua News Agency. Cf. "Defense minister meets Cuban guests," Beijing, People's Daily, 3 September 2004.

17. Agence France-Presse, "Nueva delegacion militar china de visita en Cuba," Havana, 7 July 2004. See also Raynaldo Rassi, "Recibio Fidel al Coronel General Xu Caihou," Granma Internacional, 24 April 2004, [http://www.granma.cu/espanol/2004/abril/sab24/recibio.html].   On Gen. Xu Caihou, see "Who's Who in China's Leadership," [http://www.china.org.cn/english/PP-e/48930.htm] and PLA Daily, "Central Military Commission" Xu Caihou,"[http://english. pladaily.com.cn/special/database/cmc/xu.htm].