An Information Service of the Cuba Transition Project Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies University of Miami

 

Staff Report

     The real prospects for a transition to democracy in a post-Fidel Castro Cuba seem bleaker than ever. Cuba is undergoing both a process of succession and a Chinese-type cultural revolution, albeit less dramatic than the one that took place in China under Mao.

     Since the Fifth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party in 1997, Fidel Castro has been grooming his brother to replace him. In private meetings and public speeches Castro showed significant concern about his own mortality and his desire to ensure succession rather than transition once he departs from this world. The party Congress reasserted Raúl as the undisputed heir to Fidel’s dynasty. Fidel summoned the faithful to support Raúl so as to ensure the continuity of the revolution.

     While Raúl’s position as head of the military and second party secretary makes him the logical replacement for Fidel, it seems that the older brother wanted to make it clear to the party cadres and the population at large that his brother, as his anointed heir, should be supported and obeyed and that his leadership would be best for Cuba’s future.

     The last decade has made Castro’s wishes a reality. Raúl and the military have increased, in an unprecedented fashion, their control of the economy.(1) Indicative of a succession that is already under way, Raúl now exercises far-reaching authority as the de facto day-to-day manager of Cuba’s internal affairs.

     Castro has returned also to an emphasis on ideology, particularly anti-Americanism, to motivate and engage a Cuban population characterized by apathy, alienation, and boredom with the promises of a failed revolution. Increasingly, Cubans risk their lives in makeshift boats to escape the island, cue to obtain a visa to come to the United States, or await Castro’s death and better times. The ongoing “Battle of Ideas” is a euphemism for ideological indoctrination and psychological pressure and is Castro’s attempt to create an elusive “new man” in Cuba.

     The “Battle of Ideas,” the appointment of old Marxist leaders to run the Communist Party schools, the crackdown on Internet access, the arrest in 2003 of 75 prominent dissidents, and the continuous harassment of opposition groups strongly suggests that Cuba is undergoing an era of cultural and ideological “purification” akin to that of Mao’s last years in China. An aging leader seems to be trying to purify and rejuvenate an exhausted revolution before departing from this world.

     Yet, the Castro era is coming to an end if for no other reason than biological reality. Castro is 78 years old and deteriorating physically. In 2001 he succumbed to a brief fainting spell; in 2004 he fell and suffered bone fractures which left him temporarily incapacitated for several months. Both events, which occurred in public and were broadcast on Cuban and international television, caused significant anxiety and speculation among Cubans about a future without Fidel.

     Economic subsidies from Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela assure that Havana will, as things now stand, have the means to muddle through economically for the foreseeable future.(2) Meanwhile, another important ally, China, not only provides generous trade credits, investment capital, technology, and other forms of support to the Castro regime, (3) but may also represent a viable succession model for Raúl to creatively adopt and adapt to his needs and ambitions.(4) In the near term, aid from strategic political allies like Venezuela and China, ventures with reliable business partners such as Canada and the European Union, tourism earnings, and remittances from Cubans abroad will continue to keep the current regime and its successor afloat.

     Recent trends reveal that Castro has been backtracking on the limited reforms implemented in the 1990s. “Entrepreneurial socialism”(5) is now in retreat from public life and perhaps on its way to virtual extinction. The number of legally self-employed Cubans -- those who hold an official license to run home-based restaurants (paladares) and bed-and-breakfast establishments (casas particulares), or are allowed to earn a living by providing services to fellow citizens – has fallen from more than 200,000 in 1995 to less than half as many today.(6) As one official Cuban economist argues, “Cuentapropismo [self-employment] is the least akin to socialism of all forms of production. It’s the mode of production that emphasizes most the role of the individual… [and hence] not the option for Cuba.”(7) The other measure which brought about a limited liberalization of the economy in the 1990s, the legalization of the U.S. dollar, has likewise been reversed. In November 2004, Havana withdrew U.S. currency from circulation and ceased to recognize it as legal tender in the island, driving Cubans to surrender their dollars to the state in exchange for newly printed Cuban convertible pesos.(8)

     Meanwhile, Raúl Castro has launched an internal crackdown on corruption and lax capitalistic attitudes within the state itself. In a clear indication of his power and of the Cuban military’s already extensive role in the island’s economy, Raúl warned senior Communist party leaders, bureaucrats, and managers at state-owned enterprises that “liberalism has led to a lack of respect for the party and government within tourism and other economic sectors,” and that he “would not hesitate” to further militarize the Cuban economy if he “had to.”(9)

     During his talk to the managerial elites of the government bureaucracy, the Communist party, and the armed forces on May 5, 2005, Fidel Castro called on Cubans, and presumably the senior leadership in particular, to “learn economic theory and practice” so as to “apply a more realistic socialist formula” to the island’s economic problems. Castro also insisted that individual Cubans must adopt “principles of self-improvement,” but without “falling into a consumer mentality.”(10)

     Castro lectured on economic matters as his designated successor headed back to Cuba after a two-week Asian tour during which he visited foreign investment zones in China, Vietnam, and Malaysia.(11) Dressed in business suits instead of his habitual military attire, Raúl looked and acted the role of a head of state. How soon the complete transfer of power to Fidel’s brother will take place is difficult to ascertain. What is clear, however, is that Cuba is not undergoing a transition to democracy or a free market society by any stretch of the imagination. On the contrary, the Castro brothers seek to assure the continuity of their regime and ideology well into the future.

_________________________________________________

     Notes

1. See The Economist, "Tourists: by the left, march," 31 July 2004; Cuba Focus, "The Cuban Military in the Economy," Issue 46, August 11, 2003 [http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue46.htm]; and Cuba Facts, "Military Involvement in the Cuban Economy," March 2005 [http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu].

2. On the role of Venezuela as a contemporary "lifeline" for the Cuban economy, see Gary Marx, "Lifeline thrown to Cuba," Chicago Tribune, May 16, 2005 [http://fullcoverage.yahoo.com/s/chitribts/20050516/ts_chicagotrib/lifelinethrowntocuba]; Cuba Facts, "How Venezuela Subsidizes the Castro Regime," April 2005 [http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu]; and Cuba Focus, "Castro's Venezuelan Bonanza," April 20, 2004, [http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue54.htm].

3. See Marc Frank, "Alliances with China and Venezuela bolster Castro," Financial Times, April 7, 2005; Mary Murray,"China gives boost to Cuba's economy," Havana, NBC News, November 23, 2004 [http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6566988/]; and Cuba Focus, "Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: China in Cuba," September 7, 2004, [http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue58.htm].

4. On the significance of the "Chinese model" as a plausible alternative to transition for Fidel Castro's successors, see William Ratliff's China's "Lessons" for Cuba's Transition? (University of Miami: Cuba Transition Project, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, 2004), [http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu].

5. At the height of Cuba's short-lived economic opening in the 1990s, the foreign press mistook Castro's emergency survival measures for genuine reform. Cf. Joy Gordon, "Cuba's entrepreneurial socialism," The Atlantic Monthly, January 1997.

6. Marc Frank, "Havana plans crackdown on army of self-employed," Financial Times, June 2, 2004; The Economist, "Small business just got smaller," October 14, 2004.

7. Cf. Juan Triana, head of the state-sponsored Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy at the University of Havana, as quoted by Reuters. See Anthony Boadle, "Cuba necesita crecer para mantenerse socialista," Havana, Reuters, 25 July 2003.

8. Anthony Boadle, "Cuba to get rid of U.S. money after a decade," Havana, Reuters, October 26, 2004; Mary Murray, "Cubans leery over dollar dumping," Havana, NBC News, October 28, 2004 [http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6336208/]; The Economist, "Hatfuls of dollars: Rich government, poor people," April 16, 2005.

9. Cf. Raúl Castro, as quoted in Marc Frank, "Anti-corruption drive signals change in Cuba," Financial Times, July 6, 2004.

10. Cf. Fidel Castro, address on the evening of May 5, 2005, broadcast live on the Internet by Cuba's state-run Cubavision Internacional. Selected remarks also published in Granma, "A este país no lo podrán ocupar jamás," May 6, 2005 [http://www.granma.cubaweb.cu/2005/05/06/nacional/articulo06.html].

11. Cf. Granma, "Raúl en Shanghai," 21 April 2005 [http://www.granma.cubaweb.cu/2005/04/21/interna/articulo04.html]; Lázaro Barredo, "Visita Raúl centros científicos en Malasia," El Habanero (Cuba), 25 April 2005 [http://www.elhabanero.cubaweb.cu/2005/abril/nro1261_05abr/inter_05abr965.html]; "Recorrió Raúl Castro zona de procesamiento en Ciudad Ho Chi Minh," 29 April 2005 [http://www.granma.cubaweb.cu/2005/04/29/interna/articulo08.html].