An Information Service of the Cuba Transition Project Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies University of Miami

 

Jaime Suchlicki*

 

The visit to Cuba of a U.S. Congressional Delegation led by Congressmen Jeff Flake (R) and William Delahunt (D) in December yielded little results. There seems to be an eagerness among some members of Congress to begin a process of normalization of relations with Cuba, especially after Fidel Castro’s recent illness. The belief persists that economic considerations could influence Raul Castro’s policy decisions and that Cuba’s difficult economic situation will force Cuba’s new leader to move toward a market economy and closer ties to the U.S.

We seem to cling to an outdated economic determinism in trying to understand events in other societies and the motivations of their leaders. Despite economic difficulties, Raul Castro does not seem ready to provide meaningful and irreversible concessions for a U.S.-Cuba normalization. He may offer more consumer goods and food to tranquilize the Cuban population, but not major structural reforms that would open the Cuban economy. In Cuba, political considerations dictate economic decisions.

Raul’s legitimacy is based on his closeness to Fidel Castro’s policies of economic centralization, control and opposition to the U.S. Raul can not now reject Fidel’s legacy and move closer to the U.S. A move in this direction would be fraught with dangers. It would create uncertainty among the elites that govern Cuba and increase instability as some advocate rapid change while others cling to more orthodox policies. The Cuban population also could see this as an opportunity for mobilization demanding faster reforms.

Raul is also unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the U.S. At a time that anti-Americanism is growing in Latin America and elsewhere, Raul’s policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the U.S. and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid. In September, Russia provided a $350 million credit package to Cuba to modernize its armed forces and Venezuela’s aid to Cuba will surpass the $2 billion mark in 2006.

Raul is no Deng Xiaoping and no friend of the U.S. He has been the longest (47 years) serving Minister of Defense. He presided over the worst periods of political repression and economic centralization in Cuba and is responsible for numerous executions after he and his brother assumed power, and some while in Mexico and the Sierra Maestra before reaching power. Raul has been a loyal follower and cheerleader of Fidel’s anti-American policies and military interventions in Africa and elsewhere. In 1962 Raul and Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev conspired to surreptitiously introduce nuclear missiles into Cuba. Raul supervised the Americas Department in Cuba approving support for terrorist, guerrilla and revolutionary groups throughout Latin America. In 1996 he personally ordered the shooting down of two Brothers to the Rescue unarmed civilian planes in international waters, killing three U.S. citizens and one Cuban-American resident in Florida. An admirer of the Soviet Armed Forces, Raul displays picture of Russian military leaders in his Havana office and late last year signed a Russian aid pact to upgrade Cuba’s military.

Raul’s politically motivated speech on December 2, in which he expressed his willingness to negotiate with the U.S., was preceded by a vitriolic attack on U.S. foreign policy and followed by the now standard qualifiers that Cuba is sovereign and that its revolution won’t change. For the past four decades Fidel Castro has been making similar statements. Raul’s proposal was aimed at foreign audiences, the Europeans and particularly the U.S. new Congress. He expects this year unilateral U.S. concessions on the embargo and the travel ban and snubbed the U.S.congressional delegation by refusing to meet with them. In a rare public statement two years ago, Raul warned that the U.S. should negotiate its differences with Cuba while Fidel was alive since “the U.S. would find it more difficult to negotiate with him.”

For the past four decades, the avenues for negotiation and engagement between the U.S. and Cuba have never been closed. The U.S. signed with Cuba anti-hijacking agreements and migration accords. Yet, negotiations alone are not sufficient. There has to be a willingness on the part of the Cuban leadership to offer real concessions - in the area of human rights and political and economic openings - for the U.S. to change its policies. No country gives away major policies without a substantial quid pro quo. Only when Raul is willing to deal, not only to the U.S., but more importantly to the Cuban people, then and only then we should sit down and play.

*Jaime Suchlicki is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami. He is the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro, now in its fifth edition.

**Originally published in The Miami Herald, January 7, 2007