An Information Service of the Cuba Transition Project Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies University of Miami

 

Jaime Suchlicki*

 

 The first year of General Raul Castro's rule is now over and no significant changes have occurred in Cuba. Yet expectations remain that the younger Castro will follow the Chinese or the Vietnamese model and even find an accommodation with the United States.

Wrong on both counts. Despite economic difficulties, General Castro may offer more consumer goods and food to tranquilize the Cuban population, but no major structural reforms that would open the Cuban economy. In his July 26 speech, he talked about more foreign investments, but emphasized greater discipline and productivity as the road toward improving the economy.

With Fidel alive, or even when he is dead, it would be difficult for Raul to reject his brother's legacy of political and economic centralization. Raul's legitimacy is based on being Fidel's heir. Any major move to reject Fidel's "teachings" would create uncertainty among Cuba's ruling elites-- party and military. It could also increase instability as some would advocate rapid change, while others cling to more orthodox policies. Cubans could see this as an opportunity for mobilization, demanding faster reforms. For Raul, the uncertainties of uncorking the genie's bottle in Cuba are greater than keeping the lid on and moving cautiously. For the past 47 years, political considerations have always dictated economic policies.

In his speech Raul also offered the United States an alleged olive branch. Yet the olive branch was surrounded by thorns. Raul criticized the Bush administration, emphasized that there would be no concessions to the United States, and concluded that Cuba would have to wait for the next administration in Washington to negotiate "our differences."

Raul does not seem ready to provide meaningful and irreversible concessions for a United States.- Cuba normalization. Like his brother in the past, public statements are politically motivated and directed at audiences in Cuba, the United States and Europe. Serious negotiations on important issues are not carried out in speeches from the plaza. They are usually carried out through the normal diplomatic avenues open to the Cubans in Havana, Washington and the United Nations or other countries, if they wish. These avenues have never been closed as evidenced by the migration accord and the anti-hijacking agreement between the United States and Cuba.

Raul is unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the United States. At a time that anti-Americanism is growing in Latin America and elsewhere, Raul's policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the United States and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid. Last year Russia provided a $350 million credit package to Cuba to modernize its armed forces and Venezuela's aid to Cuba surpassed the $3 billion mark in 2006.

Raul is no Deng Xiaoping and no friend of the United States. He had been the longest serving Minister of Defense (47 years). He presided over the worst periods of political repression and economic centralization in Cuba and is responsible for numerous executions after he and his brother assumed power, and some while in Mexico and the Sierra Maestra before reaching power. Raul has been a loyal follower and cheerleader of Fidel's anti-American policies and military interventions in Africa and elsewhere. In 1962 Raul and Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev conspired to surreptitiously introduce nuclear missiles into Cuba. Raul supervised the Americas Department in Cuba, approving support for terrorist, guerrilla and revolutionary groups throughout Latin America. In 1996 he personally ordered the shooting down of two Brothers to the Rescue unarmed civilian planes in international waters, killing three United States citizens and one Cuban-American resident in Florida.

The issue is not about negotiations or talking. These are not sufficient. There has to be a willingness on the part of the Cuban leadership to offer real concessions-- in the area of human rights and political and economic openings as well as cooperation on anti-terrorism and drug interdiction-- for the United States to change its policies. No country gives away major policies without a substantial quid pro quo. Only when Raul is willing to deal, not only to the United States, but more importantly to the Cuban people, then and only then we should sit down and play.

*Jaime Suchlicki is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami. He is author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro, now in its fifth edition.