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| Investing in Post-Castro Cuba: |
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Since the announcement by the Cuban
government that octogenarian Fidel Castro had transferred power to his
brother Raul, there has been increasing speculation regarding political
and economic changes in Cuba and the implications for American businesses.
A generalized belief has developed that a post-Castro, post-embargo
Cuba will result in a business bonanza for American companies. Observers
point out that after nearly fifty years of totalitarian rule and a failed
command economic system, Cuba and its population of over eleven million
are in desperate need of practically any product and service conceivable.
Generally, firms invest in a foreign market to (1) gain access to a location specific natural resource, such as oil or minerals, or a tourist destination (resource-seeking investments); (2) to establish feeder plants to take advantage of lower local production costs (efficiency-seeking investments); or (3) to supply the local market (market-seeking investments). Regarding resource-seeking FDI, Cuba will indeed attract the interest of U.S. companies particularly in oil, nickel, agriculture, and tourism. Even under the very unfavorable conditions for FDI prevalent in the Castro era, some international companies have sought to invest in these areas. But, with an abundance of low labor cost countries around the globe that firms can choose for efficiency-seeking investments, it is unlikely that Cuba will be able to attract this type of FDI. The Cuban labor force, after almost five decades of operating in a command economic system, is ill equipped for the demanding labor requirements of a modern market economy. Comparatively speaking, Cuba does not offer U.S. companies seeking lower labor costs a compelling reason to invest in the country. In terms of market-seeking FDI, Cuba may appear to offer a meaningful opportunity. But, Cuba represents an impoverished market with minimal disposable or discretionary income. Second, when compared to the populations of large countries such as China, or India, Cuba’s comparative market size does not rate highly to be selected for a FDI geared to supply the local market. Third, Cuba’s internal market may be inadequate to support investments in production facilities that require a much larger consumer base in order to achieve the necessary economies of scale. Fourth, production in a Cuba-based facility will be handicapped by having to import many, if not most, of the components and parts required in the production process as few will be available from Cuban production sources. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, U.S. companies, if able to export their goods to Cuba, will elect exports as a much lower cost and lower risk market serving strategy. Therefore, from the vantage point
of corporate executives, there is no reason to expect that U.S. firms
will rush to invest in a post-embargo Cuba. This remains the case even
if we postulate a best case scenario where a smooth democratic and market
based transition is taking place, and the Cuban government is policy-friendly
towards U.S. investors. Given this discouraging outlook, what steps
can be taken by a future Cuban transition government interested in attracting
FDI and a U.S. administration wanting to encourage American companies
to invest in a democratic Cuba? For example, in terms of policy
formulation, a creative package of tax exemptions, deferrals, duty-free
access to the U.S. market and other incentives can be made available
only to those firms that have established a production facility in Cuba
by a given date -say within two or three years after the embargo has
been lifted. The idea behind this timing provision is to utilize an
institutional entry barrier to provide sustainability to first-moving
firms. In the competitive environment created by such a policy, a Cuba-based
facility becomes a compelling competitive necessity
in order to avoid a disadvantageous position. Cuban-Americans, for the most part, will not be hindered by the innate disadvantages of foreignness and their investment decision-making will not be bound by strict economic rationality. The investment decisions of Cuban-Americans will be based on a different and very personal risk-reward analysis and many will seek to invest for reasons totally unrelated to resource, efficiency or market seeking motives. Moreover, in a transition setting lacking a modern legal system conducive to sophisticated contractual arrangements, a Cuban-American businessperson will be more amenable to enter into formal or informal contractual arrangements with a Cuban partner than say, a publicly traded U.S. company. Typically, in U.S. businesses, someone within the corporate structure has to “carry the flag” for a particular project. Someone has to be a “champion” persuading other executives of the wisdom of a given course of action. This is precisely the role that Cuban-American executives can perform within the U.S. corporate world; they can carry the flag for their companies’ Cuban FDI venture. Thus both as entrepreneurs and as corporate executives, Cuban-Americans can be FDI first-movers catalysts. A future Cuban transition government
needs to set aside whatever hostility it may harbor for Cuban-Americans
and employ the conceptual sophistication to recognize that their exceptional
skill sets will be essential for the island’s speedy economic
reconstruction. There may indeed be some economic opportunism at play,
but many successful entrepreneurs and executives in the Cuban-American
community also feel duty-bound to contribute whatever skills they may
posses to the reconstruction of their homeland. To a post-Castro Cuban
transition government seeking to attract U.S. FDI, Cuban-Americans represent
its “ace in the hole” –a hidden advantage or resource
kept in reserve until needed; an opportunity to turn failure into success.
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