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Recent discussion about Cuba’s
immediate future centers primarily on two possible variables: the first
one explains that Raul Castro is more pragmatic than his older, ailing
brother and that once Fidel is gone he will engage in major economic
reforms. The second one suggests profound differences between zealots
and reformers. Again with Fidel out of the picture, the reformers will
prevail and Cuba will begin to change rapidly.
Most analysts agree that a succession has taken
place and that Fidel is too ill to resume power. Raul and the military
are firmly in control. New leadership is likely to take over the presidency
of the Council of State, the Secretariat of Cuba’s Communist Party,
and the National Assembly. Yet, as long as Raul is in control, these
leaders are likely to take their cues from the younger brother and refrain
from taking individual initiatives.
The key question, then, about post-Castro Cuba
is not who its new rulers will be or what they would like to accomplish.
The key question is whether the institutionalization of the revolution
under the control of the military, the party and the security apparatus
will survive the transition from the totalitarian, paternalistic rule
of Fidel Castro. And equally important, what can any emerging leadership
hope to accomplish within the existing socio-political and economic
context.
There are also other key and more troubling
questions: Will the new rulers be able to exercise any major options
at all? Will they fear upsetting the multilevel balance of interests
upon which a new government will certainly depend?
The impediments to major change are significant:
- The months, if not years, following Fidel Castro’s death,
will be filled by a “cult of personality” emphasizing
his main teachings: economic openings will lead to political openings;
imperialism is the enemy; and internationalism protects the Cuban
revolution.
- The military, the most important institution in contemporary Cuba,
has significant legitimacy and respect and is a disciplined and loyal
force. It controls more than 50% of the economy. Will they be willing
to relinquish this economic control and their prominent role? One
of Cuba’s major challenges will be how to extricate the military
from the economy and put them back in the barracks.
- A terrorized, disorganized and fearful population hoping for change
from above, with many hoping to migrate. There is a strong belief
among the Cuban people about the efficacy of the security services
and an overwhelming fear of their repressive capabilities. The political
elite sees the development of a civil society as a major challenge
to its absolute authority and a threat to its long term control. The
limited gains made by a civil society independent of the Castro brothers
in the past few years are the result of a deteriorating economy; disillusionment
with the revolution and growing unhappiness with the Castro regime;
influence of outside forces; and a limited relaxation of the system’s
control. Yet civil society remains weak, not very effective and watched
carefully and constantly by the security forces.
The possibility of regime continuity,
therefore, seems stronger for Cuba than it was for other communist states.
Although their end came suddenly, it took decades of decay to weaken
critically the Eastern European regimes and successive leadership changes,
as well as Soviet disengagement and acceptance before their collapse.
In Poland where the trade union Solidarity
was born in 1980, as the first non-government trade union in communist
history, a military-led government remained in power for a decade. In
China, the communist regime obtained a new lease on life following Mao’s
death, initially through Deng’s reforms and then ultimately through
increased repression. In Syria, North Korea, and Jordan, children of
former leaders took and retained power. Even in Haiti, the young Duvalier
was able to cling to power for almost a decade.
It is likely that Raul Castro will draw some
lessons from these events and attempt to satisfy the needs of the Cuban
people. He will initially purchase massive amounts of food to satisfy
one of Cubans’ major complaints. After a while he may initiate
limited economic reforms, allowing private ownership of land in an attempt
to increase food productivity; encourage foreign investments in key
sectors where Cuba lacks technology or capital, i. e., off-shore oil
exploration, ethanol based agriculture; and increase consumer goods
imports from China.
Given Raul’s dislike for the niceties
of the diplomatic world and his dislike for speech making, he may remain
in the background. He will continue to control the military and security
apparatus allowing civilians to occupy key positions in the Party and
the government.
These changes, however, may not usher in a
period of rapid political or economic change or in a collapse of the
regime. The stability of the Cuban system is based primarily on the
strength of the Armed Forces, the security apparatus, and the Party
structure. The organization and strength of the bureaucracy that has
grown around these institutions seem to assure continuity. Barring the
imponderable or unpredictable, rapid change is not likely.
Perhaps the critical challenge for a Raul regime
will be to improve the economy and satisfy the needs and expectations
of the population, while maintaining continuous political control. Too
rapid economic reforms may lead to a loosening of political control,
a fact feared by Raul, the military, and other allies bent on remaining
in power. Unfortunately for the Cubans, transition may be slow and painful.
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* Jaime Suchlicki is Emilio Bacardi Professor and Director, Institute
for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami. He is the
author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro & Beyond, now in
its 5th edition and of the recently published Breve Historia de Cuba.
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