An Information Service of the Cuba Transition Project Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies University of Miami

 

Jaime Suchlicki*

 

     On February 24 General Raul Castro assumed permanent control of Cuba’s government. He became president of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers. He shed his post as Defense Minister, appointing his trusted ally General Julio Casas Regueiro and elevated other trusted generals to the Council of State. He also appointed Jose Ramon Machado Ventura as first Vice President of Cuba, his new anointed successor. “Machadito,” as he is known to his closest associates, is a hardline communist and organization commissar of Cuba’s Communist Party. The rise of Machadito marks the ascendancy of the party as the key institution, together with the military and the security apparatus, in directing and controlling Cuba's future.

    In announcing those changes, Raul showed confidence and defiance. Contrary to most expectations he elevated hardliners of the old generation to key positions bypassing younger leaders such as Carlos Lage. Raul indicated his determination to stay the course, offering only small, gradual economic concessions in the future and no political changes. To the Europeans that expected moderation and reforms, he offered none.

    Emboldened by Venezuelan, Chinese, Iranian, Russian and more recently Brazilian credits, Raul feels confident that Cubans can be pacified with growing imports of foods and consumer goods, minor economic concessions, and continuous control and repression.

    As his governing mode, Raul emphasized discipline, productivity, and efficiency. The same methods he has successfully implemented in the many military enterprises he developed and that are now run by his associates, will be implemented in the non-military economy, particularly in food production in the agricultural areas.

    The key to the rise of Machado Ventura is not only his ideological rigidity or his Marxist-Leninist credentials or his loyalty to Raul. The appointment of “Machadito” indicates the rise of Cuba’s Communist Party as the implementator and guardian of Raul’s policies. In the next few months we will see a greater role for the party insuring order and discipline in the economy. Not unlike what the military has done in major industries, the Party is now called to do in the agricultural sector.

    Under Fidel the party never fully flourished. Fidel disliked institutions. His style of leadership was personal, Stalinist, and caudillista. He viewed institutions to carry “his” policies rather than as policy-making bodies. He was never a strong advocate of the party. While major decisions in Cuba are discussed and made at the Party Politburo, it was Fidel, and to a lesser extent his brother, who dominates this body. Party Congresses have been held at irregular intervals and then only to discuss and ratify pre-approved policies.

    The military, which preceded the party in its organization and development, is now not only independent from the party but superior to it. Neither military personnel policy nor military doctrine and internal control are handled by the party. Increasingly, military figures have taken key positions not only in the Politburo but in other key party sectors. The militarization of the party has been consistent with the militarization of society and the economy.

    Relations between the party and the military appear quite good. The numerous safeguards that have been established against party infringement upon the authority of military officers prevent any possible independent activity of the party in the armed forces. This trend is likely to continue even as Raul strengthens party management and as long as the party does not interfere with economic sectors controlled by the military.

    A strong believer in organizations and institutions, Raul nurtured the party as much as possible since its creation in 1965. With his brother out of the picture, he will be elevating the party, in partnership with the military, to increase economic productivity and efficiency. He hopes that the strength of these two institutions, together with an efficient security apparatus, will bring him a few good years and ensure the continuity of the revolution beyond his time.

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* Jaime Suchlicki is Emilio Bacardi Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami. He is the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro & Beyond, now in its 5th edition and of the recently published Breve Historia de Cuba.