An Information Service of the Cuba Transition Project Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies University of Miami

 

Jaime Suchlicki*

       
       The economic adjustments initiated by General Raul Castro after assuming total power on February 24, 2008, seem to be coming to an end. The rise to the Politburo of the Cuban Communist Party of Ramiro Valdes, the dreaded former Interior Minister, and of General Alvaro Lopez Miera, Chief of Staff of Cuba’s Armed Forces, indicates a hardening of policy. As Cuba stands now, the most anti-reformists, hard line leaders are in the succession line after Raul, signaling an unwillingness of the Cuban regime to open up the economic process further and certainly not to open the political process.

       Why the change? Or why the unwillingness to continue the process of opening? First, Raul is no Gorbachev and no Deng Xiaoping. He is willing to correct some of the glaring irritants in Cuban society – not allowing Cubans access to hotels and beaches, permitting the purchase of cell phones and computers (without Internet access), borrowing land to produce food, etc. Yet, he is unwilling to move the island much beyond.

       His emphasis has been on discipline, productivity and efficiency, particularly in the agricultural sector. To this end he is reorganizing and streamlining Cuba’s Communist Party to act as the watchdog over agricultural production. The same way he entrusted the military with running Cuba’s major industries and businesses, General Castro is now turning to the Party to do the same in the agricultural sector.

       The second reason for halting the adjustments is that the Cuban leadership has seen the reaction of the Cubans and fears possible instability. The recent changes have unleashed the Cubans’ long suppressed expectations and desires. Dissidents have been emboldened and are pushing for reforms, particularly political ones. The population at large is not satisfied with the limited changes and is asking for more. Divisions between the haves and have nots have increased, as well as between the whites and blacks that do not have family abroad and have little access to foreign currency.

       The most likely scenario, therefore, in the short run, is a muddling through economic policy, a halt to further reforms, and an increase in repression. The death of Fidel Castro will also usher in a period when his legacy will be proclaimed, repeated and studied – a legacy of anti-Americanism, strict Marxist orthodoxy and discipline. This back to the past is a bad omen for the future of the long suffering Cuban people.

_______________________________________

* Jaime Suchlicki is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami. He is the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro and of the recently published Breve Historia de Cuba.