The Latell Report

Welcome to The Latell Report. The Report, analyzing Cuba's contemporary domestic and foreign policy, is published monthly except August and December and distributed by the electronic information service of the Cuba Transition Project (CTP) at the University of Miami's Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (ICCAS).

The Latell Report is a publication of ICCAS and no government funding has been used in its publication. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of ICCAS and/or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

A reader of last month’s report has proposed an alternative interpretation to my speculations on the “third man” question about the Cuban line of succession after Raul Castro. The answer is “elementary” the reader asserted, stressing that Venezuela’s president Hugo Chavez has already emerged as Fidel’s “self-appointed” successor. Chavez, he wrote, has been seen in Cuban government videos “patronizing Raul.” I did not interpret the September bedside meeting of Chavez and the Castros that way, but clearly their shrouded triangular relationship merits serious consideration.

In at least one respect --leadership of internationalist causes in Latin America-- the reader is correct. Chavez has supplanted the Cubans as the most conspicuous and influential beacon of populist, ultra-nationalist, and anti-American causes in the region. He has advanced that agenda in tandem with Havana, receiving substantial intelligence and security assistance as well as Fidel Castro’s strategic counsel.

But the “Bolivarian” record has been mixed. Success in Bolivia and the acquisition by Chavez of significant leverage in the English-speaking Caribbean have been offset by reverses in Peru, Mexico, and the United Nations. Those failures were due in part to Chavez’s extreme behavior, errors made at times when he was probably not able to consult sufficiently about tactics with the ailing Castro.

Fidel has been the indispensable linchpin in the partnership. He says that he and Chavez became close in 1998 when the Venezuelan went to Havana after being released from prison for leading a coup attempt six years earlier. As he planned to run as a candidate in the 1998 Venezuelan elections , Chavez lived in a Cuban government “protocol house” where Castro no doubt frequently visited in the unaccustomed role of his election campaign manager.

In April 2002 then president Chavez was himself the target of a military coup. But his hold on office, and possibly his life, were salvaged by Castro who managed alone, and from a considerable distance, to overturn the coup. First, in a telephone conversation initiated by an indecisive Chavez, Castro provided him with cunningly astute advice about how to behave as the coup began to unfold.

Then, in a series of late night conversations, Castro rallied and bolstered the courage of loyalist generals in Caracas, galvanizing them to restore Chavez to power. In interviews last year with a sympathetic journalist, Castro declared, with unctuous irony, that “we decided to undertake the defense of Venezuelan democracy.”

But now that Raul is exercising provisional authority in Cuba and seems likely soon to be fully in charge, how will his relationship with Chavez evolve? The approximately two billion dollars in annual subsidies and investments Venezuela provides are now crucial to the health of Cuba’s economy. Chavez could provoke instability on the island with the stroke of a pen, or just with a punitive or petulant nod.

Almost nothing is known outside of Caracas and Havana about how Raul and Chavez view each other. Some observers believe, nonetheless, that a close bond has developed because Raul controls the intelligence and security services that maintain an enormous presence in Venezuela. Therefore, it is argued, he must have been included in many of Fidel’s meetings with Chavez in Cuba and that he has the same concomitance of interests with him that his brother did.

But, except for Cuban media coverage of the September gathering of the three at Fidel’s bedside, no photos or other evidence of them together seems to exist. I am not aware that Raul has traveled to Venezuela, that he participated in other meetings with Chavez in Cuba, or that he has publicly extolled the importance of the bilateral relationship.

I am inclined to believe, therefore, that Raul and Chavez have little in common, viewing each other warily. Former high level Cuban officials have told me that Raul characteristically distrusts anyone, like Chavez, who gains intimate access to Fidel. It may also be reasonable to speculate that Raul and his military commanders feel contempt for the mercurial and often bizarre Venezuelan, who rose no higher than lieutenant colonel in the decidedly less professional and accomplished Venezuelan military.

Raul and Chavez are almost diametrically different personality types. The former is cautious, stodgy, and colorless; the latter bombastic and egotistical. It is easy therefore to suppose that they will not work well together in the future, even if they did in the past when Fidel was fully in charge. Why, in any event, would the repressed Raul, after more than a half century of subordinating himself to Fidel, have any interest in playing second fiddle to Chavez? And perhaps Chavez does look down on Raul, as the reader of my last report asserts. Surely the younger Castro will not be able to provide him with the critical strategic advice and assistance that Fidel did on so many occasions. It is very doubtful, for example, that Raul could have saved Chavez as Fidel did during the 2002 military coup against him.

So, Raul may worry, and with good reason, that Chavez’s loyalties have been focused entirely on Fidel and may not be transferable once he is gone. Raul may be concerned too that Chavez will be inclined to meddle in Cuban policy and leadership disputes that inevitably will occur once Fidel is gone.

On balance, nonetheless, leadership of the non-aligned movement may provide the best and earliest indications of how the relationship will evolve. One of Fidel’s most cherished plans --until he became too ill-- was for a second time to assume leadership of that movement. Ironically, however, when non-aligned nation leaders met in Havana in September to turn over the movement’s presidency to him for the next three years, he was too ill to be present.

Once he is gone Raul will become the movement’s reluctant president. But it is unlikely he has the same appetite for propounding radical, “anti-imperialist” causes on the world stage as Fidel always has. Raul will probably also be reluctant to allow Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque to seize the initiative in his stead. Raul has higher, more pressing domestic priorities: to consolidate the succession, strengthen the communist party, and provide more material benefits for the populace. Assertive internationalist policies would be a distraction. As a result, perhaps Raul will acquiesce in Chavez’s de facto leadership of non-aligned, anti-American causes with the hope of retaining Venezuelan economic largesse while staying focused on Cuban internal economic priorities.

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Dr. Brian Latell, distinguished Cuba analyst and recent author of the book, After Fidel: The Inside Story of Castro’s Regime and Cuba’s Next Leader, is a Senior Research Associate at ICCAS. He has informed American and foreign presidents, cabinet members, and legislators about Cuba and Fidel Castro in a number of capacities. He served in the early 1990s as National Intelligence Officer for Latin America at the Central Intelligence Agency and taught at Georgetown University for a quarter century. Dr. Latell has written, lectured, and consulted extensively.

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The CTP, funded by a grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), can be contacted at P.O. Box 248174, Coral Gables, Florida 33124-3010, Tel: 305-284-CUBA (2822), Fax: 305-284-4875, and by email at ctp.iccas@miami.edu.