| Welcome to The Latell Report, the newest
publication of the electronic information service of the Cuba
Transition Project (CTP) at the University of Miami's Institute
for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (ICCAS). The Report, analyzing
Cuba's contemporary domestic and foreign policy, will be published
monthly.
Dr. Brian Latell, distinguished Cuban analyst and recent author
of the book, After Fidel: The Inside Story of Castro’s
Regime and Cuba’s Next Leader, is currently a Senior
Research Associate at ICCAS. He has informed American and foreign
presidents, cabinet members, and legislators about Cuba and
Fidel Castro in a number of capacities. He served in the early
1990s as National Intelligence Officer for Latin America at
the Central Intelligence Agency and taught at Georgetown University
for a quarter century. Dr. Latell has written, lectured, and
consulted extensively.
Raul Castro will be 75 on June 3, younger than
Fidel by almost five years, and unrivaled as first in Cuba’s
line of succession. He is seemingly healthier than his brother,
especially in the absence of any authoritative denials from
Havana that Fidel is suffering from advanced Parkinson’s
disease. Raul has not been seen fainting, falling, or lapsing
into incoherent monologues in public as Fidel has in recent
years. No credible reports have circulated that Raul suffers
from any life-threatening affliction, and in his occasional
public appearances he seems vigorous and focused.
Most observers have assumed, therefore, that Raul is likely
to outlive and succeed his brother while preserving the communist
regime for some length of time. That was the operating principle
of a realistic simulation, “Cuba without Fidel Castro,”
that was conducted on February 3 at the Institute for Cuban
and Cuban-American Studies. Institute scholars and former Cuban
officials represented leading members of the Cuban Communist
Party Politburo, meeting just an hour after Fidel’s imagined
death.
But what if Raul were to die before Fidel? Is there any useful
way to assess that possibility? In fact, his physical condition
has always been as closely a guarded secret as Fidel’s
health has been. Just as Fidel had never been known to be sick
or bedridden until the effects of his Parkinson’s became
evident a few years ago, Raul rarely if ever admits to any infirmity.
I know of nothing on the public record since 1959 indicating
that Raul has been treated for any serious illness or been under
medical care.
He is difficult to monitor because he typically remains out
of view for extended periods. In the past such absences have
led to speculation that he was seriously ill or dead. In December
1991, for example, a prolonged absence fueled rumors that he
had died, forcing him to hold a press conference.
Such rumors flared again a few years ago, and so far this year
Raul has rarely been seen in public. It has been his preference
to remain mostly out of the limelight, aware that he is a poor
public performer and generally not admired by the populace.
But these and other factors, including his deference to Fidel’s
insatiable need to be at center stage, only partly explain Raul’s
frequent absences from public view.
They probably also result from his drinking problem. It is known
from the accounts of Cuban defectors and other sources over
a number of years that Raul is an unreformed alcoholic. Some
report that he has been drinking excessively since he was a
teenager.
By now such a lengthy record of alcohol abuse must have taken
a corrosive physical toll on Cuba’s veteran defense minister,
possibly a quite grave one. How his alcoholism may be undermining
Raul’s chances of outliving his older brother cannot,
of course, be evaluated from a distance and especially not without
relevant hard evidence. But given his age and record of abuse,
his self-destructive life style could precipitate a sudden and
critical health crisis at almost any time. Thus, despite Fidel’s
apparent diagnosis of Parkinson’s disease and his obvious
frailties, he could outlive his younger brother.
Raul’s alcoholism is probably a symptom of how poorly
he deals with stress. Former Cuban officials now in exile report
that on some occasions when he clashes with Fidel over policy,
and his advise is rejected, Raul withdraws in anger from Havana
for periods of time. And regardless of such fraternal crises,
he is known to relish opportunities to spend recuperative time
in the countryside, alone or with a few friends or family where
he can escape the relentless demands of his domineering brother.
Raul in recent years is known to shrink from high stress situations,
in contrast to Fidel who thrives on them. During public performances
during the 1989 Ochoa crisis, Raul was overwrought, dispirited,
and in one appearance, perhaps even inebriated. He has mused
publicly about a repressed desire to retire once and for all
from his grueling duties in order to decamp to a favorite remote
area of eastern Cuba. Unlike Fidel, he also muses openly about
his death. He says he wants to be buried in that same area of
the countryside. Such gloomy moments are probably subliminal
reflections of the enormous pressures Raul endures, and they
are perhaps induced by his consumption of alcohol.
Despite his weaknesses, however, Raul has always been the only
truly essential other man in Fidel’s revolution. How would
it fare if he died before his brother? A former Chilean ambassador
in Havana said of Raul in the 1970s that “there could
be no doubt that he was not just a complacent subordinate .
. . but someone who shared the full weight of political power
with his brother.” A few others over the decades have
also emphasized that Raul is the one absolutely essential bulwark
of the fidelista regime. I do not believe that Fidel
could have endured in office as long as he has without Raul’s
dependable management of the armed forces and also of large
sectors of the Cuban economy.
If Raul were to die first, the brothers’ succession plan
would be thrown into chaos. A power struggle among the third
tier of Cuban leaders, both military and civilian, would be
inevitable and Fidel’s ability to control it would increasingly
be in doubt as his health and cognitive abilities continued
to deteriorate. If Fidel lives longer than his brother, he will
immediately face the unwanted challenge of having to name one
or more other leaders to fill the four critical posts that Raul
now holds.
Appointing a new defense minister –who would possess the
virtually unchecked ability to mount a coup against Fidel or
to transform the revolution into a true military dictatorship—
would potentially be the most transcending of them. Fidel would
fear any other leader designated to succeed Raul as minister
and as first in the line of succession in the government, party,
and state.
So on balance, Cuba’s short term prospects after the death
of one brother or the other could be remarkably different. If
Fidel dies first a raulista succession will be likely
at least for some period of time. But if Raul dies first, all
those on and off the island watching for the first signs of
a transition to democracy might not have too long to wait.
The CTP, funded by a grant from the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), can be contacted
at P.O. Box 248174, Coral Gables, Florida 33124-3010, Tel: 305-284-CUBA
(2822), Fax: 305-284-4875, and by email at ctp.iccas@miami.edu.
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