| Welcome to The Latell
Report. The Report, analyzing Cuba's contemporary domestic and
foreign policy, is published monthly except August and December
and distributed by the electronic information service of the
Cuba Transition Project (CTP) at the University of Miami's Institute
for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (ICCAS).
The Latell Report is a publication of ICCAS and
no government funding has been used in its publication. The
opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of ICCAS and/or the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID).
Six months after Fidel Castro yielded power, it
seems clear that Cuba’s forty-eight year saga of charismatic
caudillo leadership has ended . . . and that Raul Castro, for
now at least, is firmly in charge.
Recent reports highlighting the gravity of Fidel’s
condition credibly suggest that he will never be physically
strong enough to exercise absolute power again. And even if
he were to recover sufficiently it seems doubtful that the country’s
new leaders –or the Cuban people for that matter-- would
want him back. Raul in fact may have recently instructed regime
spokesmen no longer to insist, as they did earlier in the interregnum,
that the infirm, 80-year-old Fidel will resume his old duties.
Actually, Raul and his allies in the uniformed services are
probably prepared to block Fidel’s return if he were determined
to be restored. Should such a confrontation between the brothers
erupt behind the scenes, the perennially underestimated Raul
would surely prevail.
Cuba’s defense minister and the broad coalition
of civil-military leaders around him have by now grown accustomed
to being in charge. Raul, after all, has waited stoically for
a half century for the opportunity to assert himself in his
own right, without his brother second guessing and criticizing
him. His lack of charisma and other deficiencies notwithstanding,
Raul believes he is amply prepared and qualified to succeed
Fidel. Thus, I believe Raul is relishing the chance finally
to put his own mark on Cuban history and that he intends to
continue moving forward smartly distinguishing himself from
his brother. Gradually, the policy disputes that seem to have
dominated their relationship in recent years are likely to be
exposed.
Raul has provided decisive and nuanced leadership
since he took over at the end of July. He is cautiously but
unmistakably elevating popular expectations for liberalizing
change. He is consulting with and delegating responsibilities
to a widening circle of other officials. Content to share the
stage with others he trusts, he has dispatched other leaders
to represent Cuba at highly visible international events. He
has brought previously marginalized officials –notably
Ramiro Valdes—back into the leadership, and may restore
other once highly regarded officials (Carlos Aldana, Marcos
Portal) banished by Fidel.
In his relatively few public comments Raul has
made a point of abandoning Fidel’s practice of scapegoating
others. He is not blaming Cuba’s problems on the American
embargo, the Cuban-American Diaspora, or feckless and corrupt
government officials. Instead, he is admitting that the revolution’s
problems are serious and mostly systemic, or home grown. Such
a remarkably honest assessment must be especially refreshing
within the governing nomenclatura long marginalized and muted
by Fidel who in his last years in power had scant interest in
promoting debate about policy alternatives.
Not so Raul. In keeping with his style of managing
the armed forces since 1959, he is now encouraging debate and
discussion. During a recent appearance before students at the
University of Havana he urged them to “fearlessly”
engage in debate about Cuba’s problems. And he was similarly
quoted in Granma: “I always say, discuss to your
heart’s content and then bring me your differences. That
is how we form our decisions, and I am talking about big decisions.”
At about the same time the communist party’s chief ideologue
encouraged the government media to disseminate more stories
that reflect the real problems Cubans face.
Economic problems are of paramount importance to
the new leadership. Raul is intent on increasing productivity
and efficiency and wants to create more employment opportunities.
An article that appeared in Juventud Rebelde, the leading
youth daily, was surprisingly audacious, at least by the now
eclipsed standards of Fidel Castro’s era. Nearly three
hundred youths were interviewed and asked about their hopes
for Cuba in the year 2020. Their responses predictably ranged
across a broad spectrum, but the regime’s editors did
not censor one important finding. Every person interviewed said
they hoped the country’s economic problems will have been
greatly ameliorated over the next thirteen years.
So far, any mistakes Raul may have made must have
been minor ones because there has been no evidence of tension,
instability, or challenges to his pre-eminence within the leadership.
There have been no embarrassing remarks or counterproductive
initiatives. Raul is of course acutely aware that any signs
of unrest, or vacillation on his part, could undermine his legitimacy.
He probably feels there is no greater priority than to continue
taking all steps necessary to minimize that danger.
He also has no illusions about how negatively most
Cubans –and especially the younger generations—view
him. As a result he has made it a top priority to improve his
image. He was impressive and relaxed in his recent appearance
at the university and much of the audience seemed responsive
to him. Unlike Fidel, his performance there was informal and
modest. He appeared physically fit, although the actual state
of his health, like Fidel’s, remains a state secret. Raul
joked and told the students personal stories and parables, all
indicating that he intends to lead very differently than Fidel
always did. But Raul still faces an enormous –possibly
insurmountable-- challenge in repairing his public image.
Older Cubans best remember him for the violence,
repression, and draconian interventions against many innocents
that he perpetrated in the name of revolutionary virtue in the
1960s and early 70s. Homosexuals, intellectuals, artists, and
countless others were targeted by Raul and his hard line cronies.
Younger Cubans with no memories of those deeds, the twenty percent
of the population born since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
barely know him because he has always preferred to influence
events inconspicuously from off stage. Nonetheless, they seem
overwhelmingly to consider him as cold, uncharismatic, martial,
and fundamentally disinterested in civilian life. Correcting
those impressions, while assuaging and engaging Cuba’s
restless, disaffected youth, will remain perhaps Raul Castro’s
most intractable challenge.
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Dr. Brian Latell, distinguished Cuba analyst and
recent author of the book, After Fidel: The Inside Story
of Castro’s Regime and Cuba’s Next Leader,
is a Senior Research Associate at ICCAS. He has informed American
and foreign presidents, cabinet members, and legislators about
Cuba and Fidel Castro in a number of capacities. He served in
the early 1990s as National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
at the Central Intelligence Agency and taught at Georgetown
University for a quarter century. Dr. Latell has written, lectured,
and consulted extensively.
________________________________
The CTP, funded by a grant
from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
can be contacted at P.O. Box 248174, Coral Gables, Florida 33124-3010,
Tel: 305-284-CUBA (2822), Fax: 305-284-4875, and by email at
ctp.iccas@miami.edu.
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