The Latell Report

Welcome to The Latell Report. The Report, analyzing Cuba's contemporary domestic and foreign policy, is published monthly and distributed by the electronic information service of the Cuba Transition Project (CTP) at the University of Miami's Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (ICCAS).

The Latell Report is a publication of ICCAS and no government funding has been used in its publication. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of ICCAS and/or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Since the dawning of his political career in the late 1940s Fidel Castro has demonstrated exceptional, often remarkable leadership qualities. Few of them would be considered admirable in a democratic society, or ethical by any standard, but they have been critical to his success in holding on to power for more than 47 years, longer than any other leader in the history of the Western Hemisphere except one. Only the nineteenth century Brazilian emperor Pedro II, in power for 49 years, ruled longer than Castro has.

It was as a student politician at the University of Havana where Castro began developing his oratorical skills while also applying extraordinary powers of memorization and persuasion to advance his interests. Before he was twenty he was practiced at seizing the initiative, going on the offensive, threatening and resorting to violence, while never waiting for fate to be dealt him.

At the university, and later when he joined the Orthodox political party and campaigned under its banner for a congressional seat, Castro’s knack for attracting media attention and thrusting himself into the limelight became highly sophisticated. He learned how to spin news coverage to his advantage, gaining experience as the chief publicist for his cause and as a voluble radio commentator. By the time he launched the attack on the Moncada garrison on July 26, 1953 he was a master of public relations.

But it was not until his momentous interview in the Sierra Maestra with New York Times correspondent Herbert Matthews, in February 1957, that Castro perfected the uniquely personal style he has employed ever since to manipulate the media. Matthews’s pivotal role in creating and then perpetuating the imagery of an idealistic, heroic, almost beatific Fidel Castro has long been well known. The journalist has been vilified by many observers and victims of the Cuban Revolution since his three part series of articles first appeared in print. He abandoned all pretense of journalistic objectivity by embracing Castro’s cause and then refusing to discern in him any defects, even long after Fidel’s betrayal of his original promises to hold democratic elections.

Matthews is the subject of a fascinating and critical new book, The Man who Invented Fidel, by current New York Times reporter Anthony DePalma. The title derives from the term Matthews pompously employed in a memorandum to a Times editor, proclaiming “the unavoidable fact that I, as inventor of Fidel Castro, am caught up in the chain of events occurring in Cuba.” DePalma makes it clear that Matthews not only relished his role in concocting the myth of Fidel Castro as an unflawed romantic hero, but that the journalist was also determined to continue influencing, not merely reporting, events.

DePalma’s account of the clandestine rendezvous between Matthews and Castro in the foothills of the Sierra Maestra is instructive. It illustrates the methods Fidel used to manipulate and deceive the reporter, the same ones he has applied so effortlessly ever since with hundreds of others. Castro began by maximizing his leverage over Matthews. He shrouded their meeting in mystery, keeping its timing and location secret until the very last moment, dealing with the reporter through intermediaries, keeping him waiting in discomfort for lengths of time, all the while encouraging Matthews’s sense that he was being granted the biggest scoop of the era.

Since that meeting, almost every other reporter who has been granted access to Castro has had similar experiences. Fidel is always absolutely in charge, controlling every detail and circumstance of the meetings. He is always sure to be in top form, rested and at ease, while typically summoning exhausted reporters late at night, after interminable and sometimes humiliating waits. Matthews was made to secretly travel the length of the island and then traverse rough terrain on foot for his exclusive meeting. Other reporters since then have also had to perform physical feats, a few ascending Pico Turquino, Cuba’s tallest, and then finally allowed to interview Castro at the summit.

The standard routine has been for reporters to camp in their hotel rooms in Havana, sometimes for days on end, waiting to be called to Fidel’s inner sanctum. Many patiently wait in vain. But even most of them feel a certain gratitude because, unlike the vast majority of journalists who would gladly interview Castro, they at least were finalists in his game. His calculus is to promote intense competition among reporters seeking to interview him, often pitting them against each other.

Since Matthews, Castro’s record in manipulating reporters to advance his interests has been nearly perfect. The Times reporter was “far from the only American whom Castro had twisted into knots,” de Palma writes. Some, wittingly or not, have been transformed during their long, late night sessions with Fidel, into fawning advocates. Once selected to be in his presence, many ask him easy questions, fail to press him or follow up, and typically endure interminable speeches without daring to interrupt. Generally, they accept and write uncritically from his perspective, often, like Matthews, providing Castro with invaluable publicity for whatever policy initiative he may be pushing at the time.

The ultimate form this seduction has often assumed is that reporters come to believe they can perform an historic role in advancing a rapprochement between Cuba and the United States. In the past it was a favorite tactic of the Cuban leader to falsely raise such expectations in interviews with influential journalists who then would meet with high level American government officials offering their services as intermediaries with Fidel.

Herbert Matthews was never able to acknowledge how exquisitely he had been converted by Fidel into a cheerleader, and many other foreign reporters since then have fallen into the same trap. For almost fifty years now Castro has never had reason to change the tactics that have worked so well for him with the international media. It is only now, as his health deteriorates and his energy wanes, that he has cut back severely on the meetings with reporters that for so many decades he delighted in scheduling and that so bountifully served his purposes.

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Dr. Brian Latell, distinguished Cuban analyst and recent author of the book, After Fidel: The Inside Story of Castro’s Regime and Cuba’s Next Leader, is a Senior Research Associate at ICCAS. He has informed American and foreign presidents, cabinet members, and legislators about Cuba and Fidel Castro in a number of capacities. He served in the early 1990s as National Intelligence Officer for Latin America at the Central Intelligence Agency and taught at Georgetown University for a quarter century. Dr. Latell has written, lectured, and consulted extensively.

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The CTP, is partially funded by a grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), can be contacted at P.O. Box 248174, Coral Gables, Florida 33124-3010, Tel: 305-284-CUBA (2822), Fax: 305-284-4875, and by email at ctp.iccas@miami.edu.