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Welcome to The Latell Report. The Report, analyzing
Cuba's contemporary domestic and foreign policy, is published
monthly except August and December and distributed by the electronic
information service of the Cuba Transition Project (CTP) at
the University of Miami's Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American
Studies (ICCAS).
The Latell Report is a publication of ICCAS and
no government funding has been used in its publication. The
opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of ICCAS and/or the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID).
There have been many pretenders and aspirants widely
considered to be next after the Castro brothers in Cuba’s
line of succession. Che Guevara, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Osvaldo
Dorticos, Carlos Aldana, Ramiro Valdes, and today Carlos Lage
have been the most conspicuous among them. But until now none
ever really had a chance at grasping that illusory brass ring
for long. The Castro brothers after all have never tolerated
a “third man” looming close to them in power. This
is one of the most important reasons why no serious challenge
to their authority has been mounted since the early 1960s.
But with Fidel Castro gravely ill and the 75-year-old
Raul provisionally in charge, this fundamental rule of survival
will soon have to be discarded. Raul will need to elevate another
leader --most likely a civilian-- who will accumulate extended
institutional and decision making authorities while becoming
next in the line of succession as the previously feared “third
man.”
Who among the second tier of Cuban leaders are
the most likely candidates? Will one or more dark horse possibilities
from outside the inner circle be in the running? Speculation
must begin with Fidel Castro’s proclamation of July 31,
when he delegated power to Raul and designated six other civilian
officials to assume lead responsibility in specific policy areas.
But only one, Politburo member and Secretary of the
Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, Carlos Lage,
was mentioned twice.
Lage was named “principal promoter”
of all Cuban energy programs as well as ranking member of a
three man commission to manage the finances of major policy
areas. Fidel Castro (or Raul, who may have actually been the
principal author of the proclamation) intended to signal their
confidence in Lage, who has held high level positions for many
years. His unusually long tenure, and the trust he has won from
both Castros, ranks him with the legendary Carlos Rafael Rodriguez,
a leader who survived for decades near the top of the revolutionary
leadership while never challenging the Castros or appearing
too ambitious.
Lage is respected by foreign diplomats and businessmen
and is viewed as the regime’s most sophisticated advocate
of limited economic reforms. Recently, he has represented Cuba
at international conclaves that Fidel himself would normally
have attended. In his mid 50s, Lage is the most prominent of
the younger generation of technocrats. Raul may arrange to have
him appointed as Cuba’s president, while himself holding
the most important reigns of power in the military, security
services, and communist party. As Cuba’s president Lage
would project the image of a younger, more collegial, civilian,
and modern leadership.
Two others often mentioned by foreign journalists
as viable candidates for “third man” status have
little chance. The boorish foreign minister, Felipe Perez Roque,
one of those named in Castro’s proclamation, is often
described pejoratively in Cuba as a “taliban” and
as Fidel’s parrot. Figurehead National Assembly president
Ricardo Alarcon notably was not among the six officials named.
He has no top management or policy making experience, and like
Perez Roque, is believed out of favor with Raul.
For various reasons the remaining four officials
named, are probably not realistic possibilities either. Politburo
members Jose Ramón Machado Ventura and Jose Ramon Balaguer,
especially the former, are major players and will continue to
wield influence, but they are from the elderly generation of
revolutionaries. Politburo member Esteban Lazo and
national bank president Francisco Soberon will remain influential
although their experience and portfolios have been too specialized
to qualify them as “third man” candidates.
The prospects of former minister of interior Ramiro
Valdes are more difficult to assess. He and Raul were bitter
rivals for many years until he was summarily removed from office
in 1985. But Valdes, who was named to the Council of State a
few years ago, and was more recently awarded a key ministerial
post, is making another comeback. He is ambitious and ruthless
and still feared by the populace after two terms running the
security services. He probably still despises Raul, and might
still hope to supplant him. But he will be kept under intense
scrutiny by enemies in the uniformed services and could only
pose a serious threat if he could clandestinely enlist powerful
military and intelligence allies in a rebellion. Valdes’s
recent rehabilitation was probably intended to strengthen the
succession by presenting a united front behind Raul and also
as a warning to dissidents.
Two other dark horse possibilities have better
chances. Both have enjoyed Raul’s enthusiastic backing,
are younger than he is, and broadly experienced in civilian
policy making. Ulises Rosales del Toro, a three star general
and former long time military chief of staff is one of Raul’s
most trusted and capable intimates. Currently running the sugar
industry, he is considered a modernizing economic reformer,
a pragmatist, and a tough military commander. Rosales is probably
the leading candidate to succeed Raul as defense minister, and
in that capacity would be the de facto “third
man.”
Finally, Carlos Aldana, who was fired from his
top posts in 1992 when he was 50-years-old may return to power.
Before his dismissal, he was widely acknowledged as the “third
man,” but had also become conspicuous as an advocate of
economic and even political liberalization. A few months before
his fall he told a European journalist that Cuban dissidents
and human rights activists could expect fair treatment if they
stood for office in the National Assembly. It was an unprecedented
lapse that Fidel could not tolerate.
Surprisingly too, it was after his dismissal that
Aldana was allowed by the regime to be interviewed at length
by a Mexican journalist. He and Jose Ramon Balaguer, who was
also present, emphasized that Aldana was still respected by
his colleagues, suggesting he would eventually be given new
responsibilities. A commission had investigated charges against
him and was “convinced,” Aldana told the journalist,
“that at no time was there bad faith on my part. I acted
in good faith as a revolutionary.”
Raul probably believed that too and therefore,
there is a good chance he will seek the advice of his old ally
and confidante. If Aldana were able to demonstrate the same
organizational and political skills that he did during his first
run on the Cuban stage, he could possibly even emerge gradually
in the raulista regime as the putative “third man”,
Cuba’s Deng Xiaoping.
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Dr. Brian Latell, distinguished Cuba analyst and
recent author of the book, After Fidel: The Inside Story
of Castro’s Regime and Cuba’s Next Leader,
is a Senior Research Associate at ICCAS. He has informed American
and foreign presidents, cabinet members, and legislators about
Cuba and Fidel Castro in a number of capacities. He served in
the early 1990s as National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
at the Central Intelligence Agency and taught at Georgetown
University for a quarter century. Dr. Latell has written, lectured,
and consulted extensively.
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The CTP, funded by a grant
from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
can be contacted at P.O. Box 248174, Coral Gables, Florida 33124-3010,
Tel: 305-284-CUBA (2822), Fax: 305-284-4875, and by email at
ctp.iccas@miami.edu.
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