During a meeting in May, 1966 with Herbert Matthews, his favorite and most pliable American journalist, Fidel Castro confided that the period immediately following his demise "would be the most difficult."

Matthews’s unpublished notes of the conversation, archived at Columbia University, show that Castro believed the "difficulties" he euphemistically referred to "would be overcome" and that Cuba "would settle down." He was concerned that his successors would not be able to maintain stability in his absence, perhaps that his brother Raul’s legitimacy was insufficient to smoothly consolidate a successor regime, and ultimately, that there could be instability and violence. But indirectly he also expressed confidence that the Cuban military would restore order and that his revolution would go forward without him.

Today, more than forty years later, the same concerns are on the minds of Cuban leaders. In the fourteen months since Castro’s partial abdication no uprisings or challenges to his brother’s authority have been reported. Yet, the two key variables that were at the heart of Fidel’s rumination with Matthews –the reliability of the uniformed services and the depth of popular support for the regime— are still the most crucial ones.

Once Fidel Castro’s iron grip finally is released, his successors are not sure what might occur in the streets, even though most Cubans by now are prepared for the announcement of his death. Popular expectations for liberalizing change already are high, especially among the youth, although little of consequence has been achieved thus far in their behalf. Given their frustrations and the hardships they endure, it is possible that spontaneous demonstrations could occur following the announcement of Castro’s death. Certainly the regime is concerned about that possibility.

In late July and August, 2006 following the announcement of Castro’s "provisional" abdication the regime took elaborate security precautions. Similar, stringent measures are sure to be implemented again before his death is announced. Security and military forces, including elite military units, will be mobilized and dispersed to potential trouble spots. Undercover intelligence and police will be put on high alert, and preventive detentions and intensified surveillance of dissidents and others will be likely.

Such precautions will be maintained for an extended period. Fidel Castro’s successors will not take any chances as they make preparations for the funeral observances that will attract large numbers of international dignitaries and media. With so many foreign witnesses and international film crews present, any evidence of popular unrest would undermine the legitimacy of the successor regime and could do lasting damage.

Whether Fidel Castro actually believed it or not in 1966, he spoke confidently to Matthews of the revolution’s support with the populace. Always Fidel’s faithful scribe, Matthews said he "spoke with immense enthusiasm of the fervor of the people" for the revolution. "It has really got hold of them." After all, Castro is said to have pontificated, "This is the only way we can make and sustain a revolution. Its basis has to be in the people."

Certainly Castro, or Matthews, or both, were exaggerating the regime’s popular support at that time. Their conversation took place not many months after the Camarioca refugee sealift, the initiation of the Freedom Flights from Varadero, and the installation of the leadership cadre of the new fidelista communist party. Popular discontent was widespread. Rivalries and policy disputes within the leadership were intense. Major purges had recently occurred and others would follow.

Today the regime probably enjoys even less popular support than it did in 1966, and perhaps less than at any time since its inception. The Castro brothers and other leaders have openly acknowledged the dangerously profound alienation of Cuba’s youth. Despite the transitional regime’s efforts to engage and assuage the under thirty-five "Lost Generation," tensions seem certain to increase.

Instability could take many forms depending on how those conditions were first ignited. At the lowest end of the spectrum isolated popular disturbances in one or a few urban areas --sparked either by economic or political triggers-- might prove to be relatively easily and bloodlessly contained by the police and security forces.

Even then Cuban leaders would probably seek to ameliorate the underlying animosities by enacting targeted reforms. Leaders will be intent on preventing all forms of civil disobedience and disturbances, however, fearing that once underway they could spiral out of control. But under conditions of sustained popular unrest the regime could be faced for the first time since the early and mid-1960s with an opposition that might begin to coalesce.

Fidel Castro’s successors would be uncertain and probably divided about how to respond to such challenges. Without the implacable Fidel to order merciless crackdowns and military campaigns to eradicate all opposition, his successors would probably experiment with different means of reducing or co-opting opposition elements. Moderates in Raul’s circle would advocate negotiations and concessions to pacify a rising opposition. Hardliners, also in his entourage, would demand to do what Fidel would, by brutally extinguishing all enemies of the old order. Their different strategies and priorities would in all likelihood generate discord and possibly open conflict.

As always, the armed forces will be the key. The generals will be loath to order bloody repression of civilians in public places, and at least some officers would be likely to refuse orders to do so. In such a crisis atmosphere, generals could force change at the top almost at will, even to the extent of backing a rival to Raul or his eventual successor. Though both possibilities are unlikely now, the generals will remain more powerful than any conceivable combination of civilian leaders, that is, as long as command and control in their ranks remains steadfast.

 

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