| Welcome to The Latell
Report. The Report, analyzing Cuba's contemporary domestic and
foreign policy, is published monthly except August and December
and distributed by the electronic information service of the
Cuba Transition Project (CTP) at the University of Miami's Institute
for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (ICCAS).
The Latell Report is a publication of ICCAS and
no government funding has been used in its publication. The
opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of ICCAS and/or the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID).
Delivering on Raul’s
Promises
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Raul Castro has delivered
only a few major speeches during the twenty-one months since
he took the reigns of power, a period of time in which his
brother would typically have emitted a hundred or more. Public
performance has never been Raul’s forte. Despite decades
of trying to improve his delivery, his oratory still falls
flat. He rarely says anything inspiring or unrehearsed. As
in his inaugural address on becoming Cuba’s new president
on February 24, he almost always reads methodically from a
script.
But surprisingly, what seemed
for so long to be a deficiency that could undermine his ability
to govern in his own right turns out to be a critical asset.
Cubans are relieved they are no longer required to listen
to interminable speeches, especially if, as so often in the
past, they had to stand under a blazing sun for hours at a
time. They appreciate that they are not being imposed on or
hectored, as they were, by a leader obviously unsympathetic
to their daily plight. And they are grateful now not to be
summoned to march in manifestations of revolutionary fervor
for causes that have no bearing on their real needs.
In part Raul’s leadership
style is calculated to enhance his popularity by contrasting
himself favorably with his brother. Raul knows he was feared
and despised by many Cubans who remembered vividly his part
in brutal executions and repression, and has therefore been
intent on improving his standing. Since a long article (La
Cercania de Raul), a paean that dramatically contrasted
him with Fidel, was published in May, 2006, Raul has increasingly
presented himself to the Cuban populace as the un-Fidel.
He is not contemplating any
political opening. But he is elevating popular expectations
for economic and social decompression with promises of major
structural and conceptual change, and then delivering on them.
Cubans are aware too that nearly all of the promises Raul
made in his February speech represent significant breaks from
fidelista orthodoxy. His brother would not have permitted
any of the initiatives Raul has undertaken.
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Consultation with the Populace.
During his early years in power Fidel pretended to consult
intimately with the masses. He called it “direct democracy,”
but of course it was neither. Raul’s promises to engage
the people have been of an entirely different order. On
February 24 he said, remarkably, that Cuba has been “permanently
opened to free debate.” And then to clarify his intent
he added that we must “question everything.”
Under Fidel such doubting would have been branded as counterrevolutionary.
So I thought that after about five million Cubans engaged
in tendentious debates about Cuba’s myriad domestic
problems last fall, Raul might retreat from such potentially
destabilizing promises. But he made them even more explicit
in his most recent speech. “The best solutions,”
he said, “can come from a profound exchange of differing
opinions.”
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Easing Hated Official Restrictions.
Raul reiterated an earlier promise to “reduce excessive
prohibitions and regulations.” Fidel’s preference
for what Raul described as “the enormous amounts of
meetings, coordination, permissions, conciliations, provisions,
rules, and regulations” had caused debilitating inefficiencies,
even gridlock. Raul promised that the “most simple
of them” would soon be lifted. And a number of potentially
significant reforms have been taken or outlined in the two
months since his speech, including ones to reduce restrictions
on home ownership; sales of computers, DVDs, cell phones,
video players, and other appliances; as well as access to
hotels previously off-limits to Cubans.
-
Wage and Monetary Reform. The system
of dual currencies first introduced by Fidel in 1993 is
one of the most alienating and polarizing policies the Revolution
ever adopted. Raul promised a “progressive, gradual,
and prudent revaluation of the peso” and to delve
into the phenomenon of the dual currency.” That cautious
language indicates that changes in this area will be among
the most difficult to make. But more modest steps have already
been announced or presaged. Restrictions that put ceilings
on how much wage earners can make are being lifted. Raul
also promised “to protect and steadily increase the
income and savings of the populace, especially the least
favored.”
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Agricultural Reform. Last July Raul
promised major restructuring in the crippled agricultural
sector, and a number of changes, whose impact on productivity
is not yet apparent, have been announced. Like the early
Chinese economic reform model, they seem intended to decentralize
planning, management, and marketing of food production while
encouraging greater private initiative. Raul has also hinted
at the need for foreign investment in agriculture, but has
not yet revealed any plans.
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Changes in Government Institutions and
Leadership. On February 24 Raul surprised most observers
with the appointment of his alter ego, Jose Ramon Machado
Ventura, as first vice president of the Councils of State
and Ministers, and therefore first in the line of succession.
A few other new faces were added to the Council of State,
and it seemed clear that Raul was strengthening the hand
of his closest and highest ranking military and communist
party associates. But in remarks during that speech that
have attracted little attention, he also promised that “the
composition of government” will be reevaluated later
this year. “Decisions about which changes may be required
in institutions” as well as “appointments”
will be made. He made clear that his intent is a “more
compact” and streamlined system of government institutions.
He seemed to hint that capable civilian technocrats would
gain influence, probably including a number of representatives
of younger generations.
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Decentralization. Raul signaled
too that leadership and institutional changes, now undoubtedly
under intense review, will result in much greater decentralization.
“Many believe,” erroneously he implied, “that
solutions to every problem require a national measure.”
He provided no specifics about
the kind of restructuring he no doubt has in mind, or about
who in the current leadership may rise or fall in the reshuffling
that will probably start to be unveiled in the next few months.
Once all that is accomplished, the true composition of Raul’s
regime will be revealed. Certainly, some familiar faces in
the highest ranks of the civilian bureaucracy will be elevated
or given substantial new responsibilities, and some others,
closer in the past to Fidel than to Raul, will be eclipsed.
And surely by then, anyone who may still believe that Raul
Castro is not actually calling the shots in Cuba ought to
understand that a new era has begun.
_______________________________
I wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance
provided by Vanessa Lopez, my University of Miami student
research assistant, in the preparation of this report.
______________________________
Dr. Brian Latell, distinguished Cuba analyst
and recent author of the book, After Fidel: The Inside
Story of Castro’s Regime and Cuba’s Next Leader,
is a Senior Research Associate at ICCAS. He has informed American
and foreign presidents, cabinet members, and legislators about
Cuba and Fidel Castro in a number of capacities. He served
in the early 1990s as National Intelligence Officer for Latin
America at the Central Intelligence Agency and taught at Georgetown
University for a quarter century. Dr. Latell has written,
lectured, and consulted extensively.
________________________________
The CTP, funded by a grant
from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
can be contacted at P.O. Box 248174, Coral Gables, Florida 33124-3010,
Tel: 305-284-CUBA (2822), Fax: 305-284-4875, and by email at
ctp.iccas@miami.edu.
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