Former New York mayor Ed Koch was fond of
hovering at busy subway station entrances and startling
commuters by asking, with a big smile and a handshake, “How
am I doing?” There is no Cuban equivalent of course,
not even remotely so, yet in his own diffident way Raul
Castro must be wondering how his “provisional”
administration has done.
Fair to say, the record of his interregnum is mixed. Nothing
truly transformational has occurred, and may never as long
as this innately cautious career military officer is in
charge. He may ultimately decide against any real economic
decentralization, fearing it could ignite instability. Most
of his brother’s calamitous legacies may be just too
difficult for him to repudiate. And perhaps, even now as
the need to decide is urgently upon him, Raul may not be
able to assure that Fidel vacates the Cuban presidency.
That will be the most critical test of how Raul is doing.
He is likely under considerable pressure to finalize the
transfer of power soon. It has been eighteen months since
Fidel has been out of sight, and increasingly too, out of
mind. A particularly insightful Cuban recently observed
that the populace has moved on beyond Fidel, without fear
or cognizance of him, and with an abiding sense of relief
that he is no longer able to impose on them. This person
observed that “Fidel has been forgotten as absolutely
by the Cuban people as all of those boring Russian movies
they had no choice but to watch for so many years.”
It’s not clear to what extent Raul has taken a lead
in engineering Fidel’s evanescence. But he is nonetheless
its principal beneficiary and it may actually be his most
important accomplishment thus far. He has in other ways
too begun to stimulate and lift the popular mood on the
island, even if he can claim no credit yet for providing
significant improvements in the mostly miserable lot of
the Cuban people.
Yet, anecdotal accounts suggest they have a better image
of Raul now than in the past. To their relief he has delivered
only a few speeches since taking over, and, unlike Fidel’s
interminable and desultory oratory, when Raul speaks, he
is succinct, precise, and on subject. He mostly avoids the
front pages of Cuba’s newspapers, is known to delegate
and share power, and has made sure to convey the image of
himself as a family man. He has communicated through the
leadership ranks that he prefers to work a normal day and
does not want to be disturbed after hours. Unlike his brother,
he permits no self imagery of heroic accomplishments or
extraordinary personal capabilities.
He is not known to have traveled abroad since Fidel’s
confinement, and has had neither the time nor interest in
mounting mass demonstrations against the United States.
For Fidel, problems at home were always less important than
internationalist posturing, but Raul communicates the impression
of concentrating almost exclusively on domestic problem
solving. Notably, he has almost entirely ignored the non-aligned
movement that Cuba has led since September 2006. All of
this is surely calculated to contrast his personal and leadership
styles with Fidel’s and to demonstrate that his priorities
are more attuned to the real needs of the populace.
Raul and those speaking for him have admitted that Cuba’s
many grave problems are systemic. In their disarmingly truthful
view, it is not the American economic embargo or “imperialism”
that are the cause of all problems on the island, as Fidel
always insisted, but rather their own mistakes and mindsets.
In turn, Raul has called on Cubans, especially the younger
generation, to “debate fearlessly” and help
devise solutions for the failures. Brutally candid discussions
at the grass roots level have proliferated. Not long ago
all this would have been considered counter-revolutionary
blasphemy.
There have
been no reports of the death penalty being invoked, even
in the cases of young hoodlums guilty of killing a military
officer. Despite continuing brutal repression of the country’s
human rights and dissident groups, Raul has allowed some
limited social decompression. Intellectuals, artists, and
previously oppressed homosexuals have been given more space.
Juventud Rebelde, the newspaper intended for Cuban
youth has been innovatively reconfigured, publishing investigative
stories that could never have been aired while Fidel was
in charge. Even the previously sacrosanct public health
system has come under critical scrutiny in its pages.
Remarkably
too, The Lives of Others, an Oscar winning film
about the amorality of communist East Germany’s repressive
secret services was shown recently in Havana. At least one
independent and often irreverent internet site intended
for Cuba’s disenchanted youth has been allowed to
function. Without fanfare, police in Havana have stopped
ticketing illegal taxis and more buses are on the streets.
In a major address last July dedicated primarily to massive
failures in agriculture, Raul called for “structural
and conceptual” change. Given his past sympathetic
references to the laws of supply and demand, his advocacy
of liberalizing economic reforms in the 1990s, and the many
for-profit enterprises his military officers have been encouraged
to run, he probably plans to introduce market incentives
in the countryside. Private farmers are being paid more
by the government for their produce and are receiving tracts
of land so that food crops will be more available in markets.
More dramatic innovations in agriculture are likely to be
announced this year.
With his own powerful base of support in the military he
has run since 1959, the security services he has controlled
since 1989, and the communist party he manages, Raul has
led from a position of undisputed strength. He has no intention
of opening or liberalizing the political system or permitting
a flowering of dissident activity. But as he approaches
his seventy-seventh birthday in June, he gives every indication
of wanting to leave a legacy of his own, one quite distinct
from that of his brother.
_______________________________
I wish to acknowledge the valuable
assistance provided by Vanessa Lopez, my University of Miami
student research assistant, in the preparation of this report.
______________________________
Dr. Brian Latell, distinguished Cuba analyst
and recent author of the book,
After Fidel: The Inside
Story of Castro’s Regime and Cuba’s Next Leader,
is a Senior Research Associate at ICCAS. He has informed
American and foreign presidents, cabinet members, and legislators
about Cuba and Fidel Castro in a number of capacities. He
served in the early 1990s as National Intelligence Officer
for Latin America at the Central Intelligence Agency and
taught at Georgetown University for a quarter century. Dr.
Latell has written, lectured, and consulted extensively.
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